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ABSTRACT 
Japan may be about to cross the threshold of a slow march toward nuclearization. This 
thesis will highlight signals that Japan not only has the means to develop nuclear 
weapons but maybe approaching a culmination point where Japan will cross the nuclear 
threshold. This thesis relies on a range of open-source documents and previously 
classified documents of the United States and Japan in order to reveal some of these 
subtle indications.  Japan relies on four main factors to maintain its non–nuclear status: 
its alliance with the United States, nuclear deterrence underwritten by the United States, 
regional stability, and the nuclear non–proliferation regime.  As all of these factors are in 
a state of flux, Japan has felt the need to remilitarize and reduce its dependency on the 
United States.  Japan and the United States’ national security interests are diverging:  the 
United States is focused on retrenchment and remains trapped in Middle Eastern disputes.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ nuclear enterprise has deteriorated.  
Moreover, the United States has made critical choices that further raise concerns over the 
credibility of the United States as a nuclear guarantor.  All the while, Japan has faced an 
increasingly unstable region:  North Korea, China, and Russia all pose threats to Japan’s 
national security.  These threats provide additional incentives for Japan to remilitarize 
and reinterpret Article 9 of its Constitution.  These four factors are also incentivizing 
Japan to reconsider its latent nuclear weapons capabilities.  If present geo-political 
conditions do not change, Japan’s non-proliferation stance will culminate and Japan will 
develop an indigenous nuclear weapons program.  
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
From the mid–1800s through today, Japan has struggled with its international 
identity as manifested in its foreign policy.  This struggle has shifted between idealism 
and realism.  During those times when the Japanese government viewed the world as  
utopian—the way the world ought to be, observing international norms and states 
mutually coexisting—Japan’s idealist nature has been evident.  However, when the 
realities of international relations—an anarchic system where states focus on self–interest 
and pursue self–help solutions—has affected Japan directly, the Japanese government has 
shifted its foreign policies and become more outwardly focused.
1
 
Up to the mid–1800s, Japan was an inward–focused nation with little need for 
major foreign policy.  Japan had not joined or been affected by the industrial revolution 
that the West was experiencing.  With little need for foreign markets, Japan was self–
sufficient.  The Japanese were an idealistic society, meeting domestic needs with 
domestic resources.  Forced by the reality of Western encroachment and the opening of 
Japan’s closed culture in 1853, Japan shifted its idealistic policy perspectives.  By order 
of US President Millard Fillmore, Commodore Matthew Perry sailed into Tokyo Bay to 
open Japan to Western trade and relations.  Though forced, Japan agreed to a proposed 
US treaty because Japan lacked a consolidated military and government.  Commodore 
                                                 
1
 Both “Idealist” and “Realist” political theories are more applicable to Western societies than Asiatic 
societies’ realities and philosophic outlooks. However, Japan’s fluctuation between self-imposed cultural 
and strategic isolationism along with its conscious expansionism—a reaction to outside pressures— 
retrospectively could be viewed in these Western paradigms. Initially, Japan maintained its isolated 
existence and was not concerned with Western expansionism or imperialism.  Asian sovereignties had not 
been violated vis-à-vis Western colonization.   As Asian countries became victims of Western colonization, 
Japan began to fear Western encroachment and the possibility that Japan could be next.  Japan began to 
redevelop itself based in Western practices.  Eventually, Japan faced Western colonization with its own 
colonization into Asia.  Though doubtful that at any point in this process Japan’s leadership was in reality 
preoccupied with observing international norms and states mutually coexisting, their actions, reactions, and 
decisions can be viewed within the context of these Western political theories. 
 2 
Perry began exposing Japan to the benefits—Japan would later learn of the pitfalls of 
industrialization on its own—of the industrial revolution and Western culture.  Japan 
faced the reality that the life it once knew would not be the future way of life.  This 
inward–focused idealism would eventually end the Shogun period, and the Meiji State—
the return of the emperor—replaced the Shogun period.  This transition was also a return 
to a single ruler to Japan—the Meiji—versus multiple rulers under the Shogunate.  The 
Meiji accepted the realist view of the future and welcomed the industrial revolution.  
Industrialization forced Japan to develop a foreign policy; and due to Japan’s limited 
natural resources, it had to open up to additional foreign markets.  The ensuing demand 
for natural resources in order to satisfy its expanding industry would be one factor that 
ultimately resulted in World War II and the forced acceptance of a second treaty with the 
United States. 
In the 1800s, Japan witnessed Western colonization of East Asia, Southeast Asia, 
as well as Southern Asia; Japan logically feared it could be next.  After the United States 
forced Japan to sign an unequal trade treaty in 1854, Japan began to fear the 
overwhelming strength of the West.  Fukuzawa Yukichi, a leading figure in the Meiji 
Government, led the movement to change the direction of the Japanese government in 
order to prevent Western colonization.
2
  The Meiji Government began to place great 
focus on developing and cultivating a military, a military support infrastructure, and a 
government that reflected Western practices.  As part of this attempt at “self–
Westernization”, Japan began to project its power outside its territory; Japan began to 
                                                 
2
 Anne Walthall, "War and Aftermath (1931-1964)." In Japan: A Cultural, Social, and Political History. 
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), 149-151. 
 3 
colonize.  Japan believed “nations had to conquer or be conquered.”3  The Japanese 
Government began to consolidate its power; the government developed prefectures over 
the old independent administrative areas.  This municipality realignment also provided 
the government a consolidated source of revenue—taxes.  Japan rewrote judicial codes 
and drafted a new constitution both reflecting Western traditions.  Japan drew on 
European constitutional theorists to draft the new constitution.  The writers of the 
constitution interwove Western rights of citizens while elevating the emperor to deity 
status.  This constitution provided for the Westernization the government desired, 
increased the importance of the emperor, while protecting the self–serving interest of 
those in power.  The “new” government now included not only a god–like emperor and 
the same self–interested bureaucrats, but also military officers.  The government matured 
and foreign policy received more focus, resulting in more prominence afforded to the 
military.  Eventually the government would provide the military more and more 
autonomy.  By the end of the 1800s, Japan had become more centralized, industrialized, 
and westernized; in the process, the government had elevated the importance of the 
military. 
Japan shifted its policy perspective after accepting the terms of the San Francisco 
Treaty, ending World War II.  The ravages of war took a toll on Japan’s industry and 
economy.  Japan was now defeated, occupied, demilitarized, and forced to rebuild its 
country.  It no longer had to focus any of its national resources toward national security, 
which effectively became the burden of the United States.  Japan shifted political focus 
back to idealism: domestic economy first; rebuild a Japan focused on Japan.  Prime 
Minister Shigeru Yoshida formed a political coalition centered on three principles:  
                                                 
3
 Ibid., 149. 
 4 
economics first, adherence to the new “peace” constitution, and United States protection 
of Japan from external threat.
4
  This policy developed into the “Yoshida Doctrine”, the 
intent of which was to enable Japan to develop into a “merchant nation” by relying on the 
United States for security while saving money and focusing on physically rebuilding the 
nation and the economy.
5
 
The United States drafted a constitution for Japan, but that Constitution produced 
unintended consequences for the United States.  During the Korean War, the United 
States approached Yoshida about developing a national military to offset the stress on US 
forces.  However, Yoshida invoked Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (Appendix A), 
which prohibited the development of a Japanese military.
6
  Yoshida also raised the issue 
that Japan did not have the economic structure required to raise and maintain a military.  
Though Yoshida and Japan wanted independence from the US post–war occupation, a 
close relationship was necessary and practical to protect its national security and 
reinforce future economic development. 
For fifteen years, the Yoshida Doctrine was Japan’s unchallenged foreign policy.  
While Japan’s economy flourished under the Yoshida Doctrine and American protection, 
the United States was fighting in a guerrilla war in Vietnam.  By the time the United 
States elected Richard Nixon as its president (November 5, 1968), the United States had 
                                                 
4
 Bhubhindar Singh, Japan's Security Identity: From a Peace State to an International State (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2013), 10. 
5
 Singh, 10; and Solingen, Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle 
East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 278. 
6
 Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and 
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling international disputes.  In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” Japan, The Prime Minister and His Cabinet, “The 
Constitution of Japan,” Tokyo, 1946, accessed August 31, 2015, 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html. 
 5 
been involved in Vietnam for over fourteen years.  During a trip to Asia in the summer of 
1969, Nixon stopped in Guam and made, in an informal discussion with reporters, what 
turned out for Japan to be earth–shaking comments.  The comments, initially called the 
“Guam Doctrine”—later called the “Nixon Doctrine”, placed the responsibility for 
defending freedom on those whose freedom was threatened.  Nixon was concerned that 
“they [Asians] do not want to be dictated to from the outside, Asia for the Asians.”7  
President Nixon further stated, “we [the United States] must avoid that kind of policy that 
will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such 
as the one that we have in Vietnam.”8  These informal comments sent shockwaves 
through Asia, particularly Japan, which depended on the United States for security and 
upon Nixon to keep his promise to observe all treaties.  President Nixon later refined his 
July comments in November 1969, when he addressed the nation.  In his address, he 
recommitted the United States to previous treaties and pledged protection to nations 
“whose survival we [the United States] consider vital to our security” against threats by a 
nuclear power.
9
  For non–nuclear threats, Nixon only pledged military and economic 
assistance, if requested, with the understanding that the threatened nation has the primary 
responsibility to defend itself.  Many Asian countries, including Japan, understood “No 
More Vietnams” to mean, that Asia was on its own; the United States was not going to 
become directly involved in Asia’s conflicts. 
                                                 
7
 Richard M. Nixon, “Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen, July 25, 1969,” Other. The Public 
Papers of the Presidents of The United States, University of Michigan, n.d., 548, accessed November 19, 
2015, 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/4731731.1969.001/604?q1=informal+remarks+in+guam+with+newsm
en&view=image&size=100. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Richard M. Nixon, “Address on the Vietnam War,” Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam, Speech, 
n.d., accessed November 19, 2015, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-
resources/nixon-vietnam/. 
 6 
For Japan, one of the primary reasons for its aggression prior to World War II was 
to satisfy the need for natural resources.  Under the Meiji, Japan’s industrial capability 
rapidly expanded, creating an increased requirement for energy and other natural 
resources.  The islands of Japan are natural resource–poor, and Japan had to import 
nearly 85 percent of its energy requirements.
10
 After World War II, in an effort to curb 
this dependency, Japan developed the world’s most robust civilian nuclear power 
program.  Japan’s research and development program is one of the world’s best, 
especially in fast reactors or fast neutron reactors, also known as breeder reactors.  Once 
mined and separated, uranium is manufactured into fuel pellets, which are combined with 
additional pellets to form a fuel rod.  These rods are grouped together to form a fuel 
assembly (quantities of pellets, rods, and assemblies vary by reactor types).  These 
assemblies are placed into reactor cores, nuclear reactions are initiated and sustained until 
the uranium is used up or spent.  After removal, spent fuel can either be stored as waste 
or reprocessed (Figure 1).  One uranium fuel pellet weighing between ten and twenty 
grams without reprocessing or recycling can replace three barrels of oil (126 gallons), one 
ton of coal, or 17,000 cubic feet of natural gas.
11
  
Japan is pursuing a closed nuclear fuel cycle.  A closed cycle will decrease the 
dependency on foreign uranium requirements.  Uranium can be reprocessed after it has 
been removed from a reactor.    Reprocessing “spent fuel” is a chemical process, which 
                                                 
10
 “Nuclear Power in Japan,” Country Profiles G-N, World Nuclear Association, August 27, 2015, last 
modified August 27, 2015, accessed October 22, 2015. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/country-
profiles/countries-g-n/japan/. 
11American Nuclear Society, “Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” An Insider's View. American Nuclear Society, June 
2013, last modified June 2013, accessed November 20, 2015, http://www.nuclearconnect.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/nuclearfuelcycle_web.pdf.  
 7 
can recover about 40 percent of the nuclear fuel.
12
  The chemical process recovers 
plutonium and reusable uranium.  The recovered plutonium is converted into plutonium– 
 
 
Figure 1. Japan’s Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycle.13 
                                                 
12
 Jeffrey W. Thompson and Benjamin L Self, “Policy Context: Nuclear Policy, Disarmament Diplomacy, 
and Technical Considerations,” Essay. In Japan's Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st 
Century (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 157, accessed September 30, 2015. 
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/56policy_context.pdf.  
13
 “Japan's Commitment to the Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” Power Line 25 (July 2005), accessed 
November 27, 2015, http://www.fepc.or.jp/english/library/power_line/detail/25/. 
 8 
uranium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel.  MOX fuel can then be used in number of Japanese 
nuclear power plants.   MOX or recycled fuel can reduce “first–use uranium by about half 
when used in light–water reactors, and potentially sixty times if it can be used by a fast 
 breeder reactor.”14 This process will assist Japan in securing long–term energy 
requirements by reducing foreign energy dependency and conserving uranium.
15
 
Over the last seventy years, the Yoshida Doctrine has successfully served its 
purpose.  The Economy–First doctrine enabled Japan to rebuild its infrastructure, become 
the world’s second largest economy—until it was overtaken by China, and develop 
domestic nuclear energy that could increase Japan’s national security.  As in both 1853 
and 1945, times, conditions, and security challenges are changing.  Japan is transitioning 
again to a realist perspective on its their strategic global position.  Japan is learning it has 
to develop more than its economic power to maintain balance in Northeast Asia and the 
world. 
Since the Constitution came into effect on May 3, 1947, Japan has observed the 
United States–imposed “Peace Article”, Article 9, of the Japanese Constitution.  For the 
last sixty–eight years, the three sentences that constitute this article have been the source 
of debate concerning the legality of a Japanese nuclear weapons program.  Many 
Japanese politicians and academics have argued that additional diplomatic vehicles 
combined with Japanese law and policies have lessened the need for an indigenous 
program.  However, few of these politicians and academics could have foreseen the 
present combination of multiple national security interests that are being challenged 
simultaneously.  Since the development of Japan’s Constitution, and as it has developed 
                                                 
14
 Ibid., 151. 
15
 American Nuclear Society, "Nuclear Fuel Cycle." 
 9 
its national nuclear policies, Japan has seen the Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty erode, 
its relationship with the United States ebb and flow, and the rise in regional threats, 
namely China and North Korea.  At the same time, Japan has desired a more prominent 
role in the international community.  All the while, Japan has resisted the temptation to 
develop nuclear weapons, but it has progressed right up to the threshold.   
Japanese policy experts point to the “three non–nuclear principles” as one of the 
fundamental reasons justifying arguments against Japan’s nuclearization.  The “three 
non–nuclear principles” are, not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the 
introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan.  Prime Minister Satō announced the principles 
in 1967, and the Diet later endorsed the principles in 1971; however, the Diet did not pass 
the principles into law.  The Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to Prime 
Minister Satō for the principles; however, Satō admitted to senior Japanese and American 
officials the principles were a mistake.  Prime Minister Satō even told US Ambassador U. 
Alexis Johnson the three non–nuclear principles were “nonsense”.16  The Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ)—when they came to power in 2009—launched an investigation into 
the alleged violations of the three principles.  The allegations were that Japan allowed the 
United States to introduce and even store nuclear weapons in Japan during the late 1960s 
and through the 1980s. Through declassified reports, the DPJ found evidence that the 
                                                 
16
 This comment has been referenced in multiple publications; however, viewing a copy of Ambassador 
Johnson’s telegram from January 14, 1969 has proved elusive, see Kurt M. Campbell "Japan." In The 
Nuclear Tipping Point Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2004), 223; Jonathan Reid Hunt. “Out Of the Mushroom Cloud's Shadow.” Out of the 
Mushroom Cloud's Shadow. RAND Corporation, n.d., accessed September 15, 2015, 
http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/08/out-of-the-mushroom-clouds-shadow.html.; U. Alexis Johnson, Letter. 
“140. Telegram From The Embassy in Japan to the Department of State.” Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 2, Japan, Document 140. Japan, January 11, 1969, accessed August 
1, 2015. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p2/d140.; and James L. Schoff 
“Changing Perceptions Of Extended Deterrence in Japan.” Essay. In Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age 
Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon, edited by Toshi Yoshihara and James R Holmes. (Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012),102. 
 10 
Liberal Democratic Party had not always followed the three non–nuclear principles.  
Moreover, during his 2015 Hiroshima remembrance speech—at Hiroshima’s Peace 
Memorial on the 70th anniversary—Prime Minister Shinzo Abe failed to acknowledge 
publicly a continuous observance of the non–nuclear principles by Japan.17 
For the last seventy years, Japan has supported the global campaign to disarm and 
abolish nuclear weapons (an abolition that, of course, would serve Japan’s interests only 
if it were universal).  Japan has retained a Waltzian third image persona:  Japan believes 
an international system, free of anarchy, will evolve from international agreements and 
established norms, and Japan’s tireless efforts on non–proliferation and disarmament will 
bring about a world without nuclear weapons.  Precipitated by shifts in relations with the 
United States, concerns with United States security commitments, regional instability, 
and the challenges facing the nuclear nonproliferation regime, Japan is at the threshold of 
its slow approach to becoming a nuclear weapon state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Reiji Yoshida, “Exclusion of Nonnuclear Principles from Abe's Hiroshima Speech Causes Stir,” The 
Japan Times, August 7, 2015, sec. National Politics, accessed November 23, 2015, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/06/national/politics-diplomacy/exclusion-nonnuclear-
principles-abes-hiroshima-speech-causes-stir/#.vlngf2hompo. 
 11 
THE US–JAPAN RELATIONSHIP 
 
At the end of World War II, Japan and the United States formed an alliance 
centered on the defense of Japan.  The closeness of that relationship has ebbed and 
flowed over the last seven decades.  For Japan, this relationship was particularly 
necessary and convenient:  After the war, Japan’s military was non–existent and the 
country was required to submit to a “peace constitution.”  Article 9, of the Japanese 
Constitution states, “The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right . . . 
.”18 Whether the renouncement of a truly “sovereign right” is even a philosophical 
possibility is an open question.  Nevertheless, renouncement proved to be convenient for 
the Japanese, allowing Japan to focus on rebuilding its nation and economy.  Over the 
years, Japan has slowly chiseled away at its non–belligerency pledge and, in the process, 
has become the world’s third largest economy.19  On the surface, the United States and 
Japan have an ostensibly strong relationship; however, Japan’s aspiration for a more 
independent relationship with the United States is becoming more visibly manifest.  A 
similar tendency is observable is some Washington circles.  Since the Eisenhower 
administration, the United States has developed policies providing indications of the 
United States’ willingness to accommodate Japan’s desire for a more independent 
relationship with the United States. 
 
                                                 
18
 Japan. The Prime Minister and His Cabinet. 
19
 The World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product 2014,” World Development Indicators, The World Bank, 
September 18, 2015, last modified September 18, 2015, accessed December 3, 2015. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/gdp.pdf.  In the same year, Japan’s economy became the 
second largest, China began economic reforms. China eventually overtook Japan in 2010 as the world’s 
second largest economy.  The world’s largest economy is the United States, followed by China then Japan 
(as of 2015). 
 12 
The Preparation
20
  
In August 1945 aboard the USS Missouri, representatives of the Empire of Japan 
signed the documents of surrender, ending World War II.  For the next five years after 
that, Japan existed under a military government led by the United States.  While under 
the military occupation government and with heavy influence from the United States, 
Japan began drafting a new constitution.  This new Constitution laid the foundation of 
Japan’s passivity and submission to the United States.  Without a means of self–defense, 
Japan depended largely (if not solely) on the United States for its national defense.  This 
cession of Japan’s sovereignty did not sit well with rising nationalism and would be a 
point of contention in the 1950s and beyond. 
In 1950, General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Command of Allied Powers 
and military governor of Japan, approached Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida with a 
request to create a Japanese military force for use in Korea.
21
   This was the first shift in 
United States policy toward Japan:  an encouragement to develop an independent 
military.  Yoshida firmly supported Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and responded 
to MacArthur’s request by creating the Japanese National Police Reserve, for which 
MacArthur authorized 75,000 men armed with small arms.  This police force would 
eventually transition to the National Safety Force and then to the Japanese Self–Defense 
Force.
 22
  The development of a national protection force marked the first time Japan had 
                                                 
20“A History of The Liberal Democratic Party,” About LDP, Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, n.d., 
accessed August 28, 2015, https://www.jimin.jp/english/about-ldp/history/104227.html.  The Liberal 
Democratic Party breaks democracy in Japan into four periods: Preparation, Prosperity, Maturity, and 
Coalitions (ordered 1945 to present).  The Preparation period was the ten years after the war where Japan 
struggled with the development of democratic rule.  This period also laid the foundation for the future 
economic prosperity Japan would achieve after the establishment of its democracy.    
21
 Walthall, 190. 
22
 The Under Secretary of State on United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Japan. 
Annex to NSC 125/3. Annex to NSC 125/3. (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1953), accessed 
 13 
deviated from Article 9 of the Constitution.  The United States Ambassador and General 
MacArthur made multiple recommendations to the Government of Japan to create a 
Japanese military force.  In the Annex to NSC 125/3 (February 19, 1953), the United 
States wanted to see a strong Japanese defense force rapidly developed. This annex was 
contrary to the United States’ position stated seven years earlier, when MacArthur’s 
advisors to Japan “essentially dictated a new constitution to Japan’s leaders.”23  The 
Security Treaty between Japan and the United States and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, 
both provide that Japan, “as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual 
or collective self–defense . . .”24  Ironically, and despite the Japanese Constitution, this 
clause provided Japan with validation for rearming with conventional or strategic 
weapons. 
The period of “preparation” continued with the implementation of the Yoshida 
Doctrine, which focused on economics.  The Yoshida Doctrine placed Japan on the path 
to become the world’s second largest economy by early 1970s.  Yoshida’s “economy 
first” doctrine led to annual double–digit economic growth between 1954 and 1971.25  
Prime Minister Yoshida realized that Japan could not compete globally or rebuild the 
nation until it had a robust economy.  This doctrine aided in resetting to a more idealist 
mindset the bushido mindset that had dominated most of Japan prior to and during the 
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war years.  The idealism of the Yoshida Doctrine positioned Japan to support the new 
international norms established via the United Nations.  The Yoshida Doctrine was not 
without its critics.  One of the first major challenges came from Prime Minister Nobusuke 
Kishi when he declared, “while Japan had thus far chosen not to develop nuclear 
weapons, it was not unconstitutional for it [Japan] to do so.”26 The doctrine would create 
a foundation from which to rebuild the military; however, it would keep Japan dependent 
to on the United States though the Cold War. 
Japan closed the period of preparation with a slightly greater assertion of 
sovereignty and of independence from the United States.  At the same time, however, the 
United States required an outpost in the Far East to combat communism in Asia.  With 
the signing of the 1954 U.S. and Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, the United 
States began treating Japan much less like a conquered nation (although  portions of 
Japan would remain occupied, including the Prefecture of Okinawa) and much more as a 
security partner—using terms like “consult”, “common security”, and “liaison”.  This 
agreement did not object to the development of Japan’s defense force and thus indirectly 
accepted this shift from the strict adherence to Article 9.  Still, Japan desired more 
sovereignty than the peace treaty, the security treaty, or the defense agreement would 
satisfy.  The Yoshida Doctrine influenced future generations to focus on the economics of 
the nation at the expense of national security.  Japan would learn to exercise its soft and 
economic state powers before shifting focus in the future to harder instruments of state 
powers. 
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Prosperity Equals More Change 
As Japan entered the 1960s and 1970s, its economy had greatly matured.  Japan 
continued its slow reestablishment and repositioning in the global community.  Annually, 
the Japanese economy saw steady improvement, with the overall size of the economy 
quintupling between 1948 and 1975.
27
  During this time, Japan continued to assert more 
of its soft power, i.e. economy and pacifism, while beginning to use more diplomacy to 
expand its foreign policies.   
The US–Japanese relationship shifted through three challenging events: the 1960 
Security Treaty, China’s first nuclear detonation (October 16, 1964), and the Guam 
Doctrine.  These were the three greatest changes in US–Japanese relations prior to the 
end of the Cold War, and these challenges occurred in the 1960s and 1970s.  The nuclear 
detonation by the Chinese and the Guam Doctrine had the most profound effects on the 
relationship between the United States and Japan.  While wrestling with the decision to 
become signatory to the Non–Proliferation Treaty, the Government of Japan also had to 
contemplate the shift of US policy laid out in the Guam Doctrine.  Throughout 
Eisenhower’s administration, the United States drafted policy to encourage Japan to 
remilitarize and open the door to nuclear weapons in Japan. This set of events drove a 
Japanese Prime Minister Satō to conduct a secret nuclear study, despite having won the 
Nobel Peace Prize for his stance on nuclear nonproliferation. 
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Toward a New Security Arrangement 
In the late 1950s, Japanese nationalism continued to build, and fears of 
communism continued to be manifest.  The United States and Japan revised the security 
treaty between the two nations.  The United States knew it needed to maintain its 
foothold in the Far East against communist advances and Japan knew its economy was 
not quite strong enough to decouple completely from the United States.  Ambassador 
Douglas MacArthur, II—General MacArthur’s nephew—stated that Japan was of “vital 
interest” and compared Japan to Germany, further stating, “Japan has the only great 
industrial complex in Asia which in a sense is comparable to the Ruhr–Western Europe 
complex.”28  The same fear existed for Japan as existed for Germany: communist 
expansion into these territories.  Ambassador MacArthur realized that the challenges 
associated with redeveloping Japan into a strong advocate for the free world in Asia were 
greater than they were with Germany.   This is so because at this time the United States 
had no strong Far East Asia ally in the fight against communism in Europe.  The 
ratification of the security treaty, in addition to changes in US policy toward Japan, 
created challenges for Japan that culminated in strained US–Japan relations and Japan 
commissioning a nuclear option study in 1968. 
The United States planned to cease barring Japan from having a military.  The 
Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) published its Outline Plan of Operations with 
Respect to Japan in 1956.  The OCB highlighted the need to reexamine the US and 
Japanese relationship.  The OCB also focused on the need to stress the importance of 
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Japan’s political, economic, and military development while pursuing a prominent 
position in Asian affairs.
29
  Their assumption was, “Japan will support US policies in the 
Far East to the extent that such policies are clearly in Japan’s interest and carry little risk 
of military involvement.”30  With the United States focusing attention on developing 
Japan as an influential force in Asia, the United States maintained an anti–communist 
outpost in Asia, feeding Japan’s desire for more independence, while relieving the United 
States of the heavy responsibility of being Japan’s protectorate.  The US’s plan was to 
have the 1960 US–Japan Security Treaty fill these objectives. 
Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, once held as a Class‒A war criminal but never 
tried in court, became Japan’s prime minister in 1957.  Kishi was a devoted anti–
communist and opponent of the peace constitution; he was instrumental in advancing the 
US’s Far East policy in Japan.31  Almost from his election as prime minister, Kishi 
negotiated with the United States for an updated security treaty.  In preparation for the 
treaty negotiations, PM Kishi addressed the Diet and provided the governing body with 
his opinion on nuclear weapons.  PM Kishi argued that nuclear weapons are not 
unconstitutional under the Japanese Constitution because the Constitution provides for 
the self–defense of the nation, and nuclear weapons can be used in defense of Japan.32  
Japan started conducting nuclear research in 1954.  Solely focused on the needs of Japan, 
PM Kishi’s address to the Diet established a new tone in US–Japanese relations.  Japan 
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provided the terms and proposals for the treaty’s revision back to the United States.  
Kishi believed the treaty would further Japan’s desire for independence and correct the 
vilification, which the peace constitution and the 1951 security treaty perpetuated.  This 
resulted in the prime minister aggressively pushing the treaty through the Japanese Diet.  
However, the Japanese socialists and communists believed the treaty was a ploy by the 
United States to maintain dominance over Japan.
33
  The socialists and communists raised 
the issue of the United States maintaining control over Okinawa and the US’s ability to 
transport nuclear weapons through Japanese territory.
34
  These two political groups 
appealed to over 80,000 Japanese workers and students to riot at the Diet building in 
Tokyo.  The socialist and communists believed this treaty went against Japan’s desire for 
full independence from the United States.  Kishi’s opposition boycotted the Diet and, 
while the police force provided protection, Kishi’s government pushed the treaty through 
and ratified it by non–democratic means.  One month later, Prime Minister Kishi 
announced his resignation. 
In 1960, two competing factions, socialist and nationalist, believed they were 
fighting for independence from the United States, but each fought over the same ideal of 
greater independence from the United States by two different methods.  Kishi believed 
that since Japan had made such an improvement in its economy, it was time for Japan to 
become a “normal” country.  This normalization included remilitarizing, making its own 
foreign policy, and maintaining sovereignty over all of its territories.  The socialists and 
communists in Japan wanted the same end states.  The difference between these two 
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groups was that Kishi knew Japan still needed a mutually cooperative security agreement 
with the United States.  Kishi’s opposition wanted to end US imperialism in Japan.  The 
public discourse over the 1960 treaty is the first evidence of a shift in Japanese public and 
political attitudes toward the United States.  These opinions exposed an initial shift away 
from the economically focused, US–dependent, Yoshida Doctrine.  When the Japanese 
public learned of the method PM Kishi was using to force the treaty through the Diet, 
thousands of students and workers marched on the Diet.  The 1960 security treaty and the 
resulting riots showed Japan flexing more of its state powers and its capacity to threaten 
the development of indigenous nuclear capability to gain or maintain its sovereignty. 
In the aftermath of the 1960 Japanese treaty riots, the United States outlined its 
revised policy toward Japan in NSC 6008/1.  The United States understood the strategic 
importance of Japan geographically, economically, militarily, and as a partner against the 
spread of communism.  US objectives for Japan included: 
35
 
22. Preservation of the territorial and political integrity of Japan against 
Communist expansion or subversion… 
 
27. A Japan ultimately willing and able to participate more actively in the defense 
of Free World interests in the Far East… 
 
38. Urg[ing] the Japanese Government to continue to refuse recognition to 
Communist China and to oppose entry of Communist China into the United 
Nations… 
 
45. . . . encourag[ing] Japan to increase its defense effort and to modernize its 
military forces…  
 
48. Develop[ing] arrangements with the Japan Defense Forces for cooperation in 
military research and development. 
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49. Recognizing the unique Japanese sensitivities to the employment of nuclear 
weapons and the desirability from a military point of view of obtaining 
permission to store in Japan nuclear weapons for U.S. forces in Japan, continue as 
appropriate the present discreet and selective efforts to bring about a better 
understanding and acceptance by Japan of the importance of nuclear weapons in 
modern warfare... 
 
NSC 6008/1 shows in detail the support the United States was willing to provide 
to the Japanese to ensure Japan’s security and block any communist aggression.  The 
latter was the US’s primary focus.  Paragraph 49 focuses on the importance of nuclear 
weapons and the effort to garner Japanese acceptance of these weapons.  The US’s efforts 
to gain Japanese acceptance of nuclear weapons led the Japanese to realize the 
importance of these weapons to the survival of Japan.  Japan could interpret paragraph 49 
to say that since the United States uses nuclear weapons to guarantee its own survival, 
nuclear weapons could be suitable to guarantee Japanese sovereignty.  Diplomatic 
conversations concerning the importance of nuclear weapons in modern warfare led the 
Japanese to commission a study, The 1968/70 Report, on the development of an 
indigenous nuclear weapons program. 
Japan was beginning to morph into a young global power.  Economic growth and 
power enabled the nation to begin looking beyond the controls of the United States.  
Further shifts in US foreign policy in the 1970s forced Japan to reconsider its relationship 
with the United States and its station in the international community.  Results of the 1960 
security treaty, the ensuing riots, and future diplomatic dialogues based on NSC 6008/1 
priorities and objectives led the Prime Minister Eisaku Satō to commission a nuclear 
weapons program study. 
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Asia on Her Own, No More Vietnams 
Japan continued to enjoy economic prosperity through the 1960s and into the 
1970s.  At that time, Japan was on the cusp of becoming the second largest economy in 
the world.  The Government of Japan also began to look more outward and beyond 
economic development.  The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, the party in power, 
began looking at the next phase of the democratization of Japan:  maturity.  As Japan 
matured globally, shifts in United States’ Asian foreign policy stunned Japan.  President 
Richard Nixon became President of the United States on the campaign promise of getting 
the United States out of Vietnam and refocusing US foreign policy.  This promise would 
have an impact on Japan’s confidence in America’s commitment to Japan’s defense. 
The Guam Doctrine, also known as The Nixon Doctrine, was the first “shock” of the 
Nixon administration.  In his address to the nation on November 3, 1969, Nixon stated, 
“When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be 
to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them.”36  This was a major shift in 
Cold War Doctrine, where the United States was directly involved in opposing 
communist aggression in such events as the Korean War, Cuban Missile Crisis, and the 
Vietnam War.  Nixon’s doctrine focused more on supporting communist opposition 
through economics and less on direct military involvement.
37
  However, Article V of the 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and 
Japan, January 19, 1960, (Appendix B) stated:  “Each Party recognizes that an armed 
attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be 
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dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”38 
The second Nixon “shock” was his state visit to China.  Even though the United 
States had pressured Japan not to recognize the People’s Republic of China since the 
Eisenhower Administration, the United States suddenly opened diplomatic relations with 
China.  The United States executed this decision without consulting with the Japanese.  
Prime Minister Satō learned of President Nixon’s China visit three minutes before the 
announcement.
39
  In his oral history interview, Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki said that 
this move by the United States caused a lot of mistrust and loss of confidence in the 
Japanese government.  As a result, Japanese intelligence began conducting analyses on 
the United States.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated a study on the military aspect 
of the security treaty, and anti–American attitudes were prevalent in the Japanese media 
and government.  Okazaki even accused Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of being an 
“anti–Japan diplomat.”40 
These “Nixon Shocks” forced Japan to contemplate security options outside of the 
United States and Japanese Mutual Security Agreement.  Nixon announced his doctrine 
at the same time Prime Minister Satō was conducting an internal study on an indigenous 
nuclear weapons program.  Japan also began experimenting with its own foreign policy 
and diplomacy, eventually normalizing relations with China and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR).  During this time, the Japanese voices advocating a stronger 
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military began to rise.  Among those voices was Head of the Japan Defense Agency, 
Yasuhiro Nakasone.  Frustrated by Japanese anti–military views, Nakasone advocated for 
a strong military and was critical of the Yoshida Doctrine.  In Nakasone’s view, Japanese 
military should be the primary focus and the security treaty with the United States should 
be second.
41
  This new focus led to the Japanese 1970 Defense White Paper to advocate 
“for a qualitative increase in Japan’s defense capabilities”.42 However, Japan had become 
too dependent on the United States’ defense support to enable an immediate change in the 
alliance.  Nevertheless, Japan increased its defense spending by 66.24 percent between 
1969 and 1972.
43
  The Japanese1970 Defense White Paper referred to a more 
autonomous defense system and consideration of the permissibility of indigenous nuclear 
weapons.
44
  Assistant Secretary of Defense McAuliffe felt that these white papers and 
more public dialogue about defense matters in Japan are “all indicators of change in 
Japan’s post WWII defense thinking.  The change is unquestionably slow but in the right 
direction and [sic] over time should lead Japan to play a greater role in its own security 
and that of the region.”45  In opposition to Nakasone Kubo Takuya, director general of 
the Bureau of Defense Policy, advocated in 1976 a minimalist defense depending largely 
on the United States.  Kubo, however, did promote the establishment of “a structure to 
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develop considerable nuclear armament capability at any time. . .”46 These moves during 
the Nixon era by Japan show that Japan was not completely subservient to the United 
States and could decide to move away from the alliance.  The main reason Japan 
remained a party to the security treaty was that the twenty years of the military limiting 
Yoshida Doctrine had impacted the capabilities of the Japanese Self–Defense Force. 
 
Maturing in a New Environment with Asymmetrical Threats 
Japan has taken multiple methodical steps toward sheading its pacifist yoke.  The 
fall of the Iron Curtain and dissolution of Soviet Union ushered in an era of major world 
changes.  During the Cold War, world affairs revolved around two superpowers:  the 
United States and the USSR.  Other countries were secondary participants, or puppets, of 
one or the other of the two superpowers.  In some cases, like that of Japan, countries were 
able to take a laissez–faire attitude toward world politics.  As one Japanese official stated, 
“We [Japan] could afford to sleep during the Cold War; we cannot afford to sleep now.”47  
In 1985, at the Japanese Defense Academy graduation, Prime Minister Nakasone quoted 
his poetry from when he was the head of the Defense Agency as a reference to Japan’s 
Cold War policy: “Amid wind and rain, hidden deep in the mountains, there lies a 
reclining dragon.”48  This alludes to the stormy Cold War years when Japan “reclined” 
and played a minimal roll in the world’s battle against communism, focusing on 
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strengthening the nation. However, even in 1985, Nakasone knew the time was 
approaching for Japan to reclaim its prominence in the global community, and Japan 
needed more than a strong economy to realize this goal. After September 11, 2001, Japan 
and the world encountered a very different multipolar world with non–traditional threats 
emanating from non–traditional sources. 
Japan witnessed the Washington’s foreign policy drift away from Tokyo.  Post–
Cold War, the United States was attempting to define its role in a unipolar world.  Then, 
after September 11, 2001, the United States became entrenched in the Global War on 
Terrorism.  Since 2008, Japan has begun to witness a retrenchment of US policy.  The 
United States has removed combat troops from Iraq, reduced combat troop levels in 
Afghanistan, continued with sequestration budget cuts, and reduced active–duty troop 
levels, all the while pledging “no boots on the ground” in Libya, Syria, or Iraq.  American 
allies could view this as the United States pulling its military back toward its own shores; 
reluctant to involve combat forces in any foreign operation. This inactivity has even been 
at the cost of agreements made with partner countries.  For example, when Russia 
invaded Crimea, the United States disregarded the Budapest Memorandum (Appendix C) 
it made with the Ukraine in 1994.  The United States even went further and advised the 
Ukrainian Government not to engage the Russian military.
49
  The Japanese saw the 
United States’ response to the crisis in the Ukraine as indicative of a potential response 
during a Japanese crisis.  In the same way Ukraine could not stand up to Russian military 
power, Japan could not stand up to Chinese power. 
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Japan is further concerned with the United States’ actions in the Middle East.  
Security assurances to allies in the Middle East date back to 1945, when President 
Franklin Roosevelt and King Ibn Abdul Aziz al–Saud agreed that Saudi Arabia would 
provide oil to the United States and the international community, while the United States 
provided the kingdom security guarantees.
50
  In recent years, United States policy has 
caused concern among many countries in the Middle East.  In the early 1990s, thousands 
of US military personnel arrived in Saudi as part of Operation DESERT SHIELD, 
angering many Islamic traditionalists.  Further strained relations with the House of Saud 
occurred in 2003, when Saudi Arabia began to question the credibility of the United 
States after no WMDs were found in Iraq as the result of the invasion.  With a new 
president and new national policies —President Obama was inaugurated January 20, 
2009—America pulled out of Iraq (2011), turned its back on long–time ally Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak, and then “pivoted” to East Asia and the Pacific.  With the 
looming fear of the Iranian threat across the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia felt the Obama 
Administration was distancing himself from the Middle East and abandoning the 
kingdom in the process.
51
  Thus, through the eyes of Japanese observing the United 
States’ actions, the United States has begun to acquiesce to Iran, possibly clearing the 
road for a future ‘closet’ nuclear weapon.  Saudi Arabia has been unhappy with the 
removal of Saddam Hussein, the current US policy with Israel, and is increasingly 
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unhappy with the lack of United States resolve over Iran and its policies.
52
  Japan has 
warily watched the United States’ actions toward one of its oldest allies in the Middle 
East. 
Now, Japan is positioning itself to transition into a “normal country”, one that 
also includes the military as part of its of national power.  Japan has relied on its strong 
economic power and has developed national interests that expand throughout the globe.  
An element that has not developed fully in parallel is Japan’s ability to protect its 
interests beyond its shores.  This shortfall in national security leaves Japan vulnerable to 
nations with stronger conventional militaries or nuclear weapons. 
The United States wants a Japan that is capable of defending itself and able to 
play a larger role in the stability of Northeast Asia.  Japan has placated the United States 
by increasing its Self–Defense Forces but has also added caveats limiting the scope of 
Japanese defense forces’ operations.  After September 11, 2001, the pressure on Japan to 
become more independent has increased; the “free ride” was ending.  The United States 
and the international community looked to Japan to participate more in United Nation 
actions.  Japan began looking more closely at its Constitution and formulating laws that 
could circumnavigate the restrictive ninth article of its Constitution.  Japan has passed 
various laws in order to classify the scope of SDF activities into six categories:
53
  
1. Activities based on the Act on Special Measures concerning Humanitarian 
Relief and Reconstruction Work and Security Assistance in Iraq. (2003) 
 
2. International peace cooperation operations (Act on Cooperation for United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations. (1992)). 
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3. Anti–piracy activities. (2009) 
 
4. Cooperative activities based on the Anti–terrorism Special Measures Law, 
Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures 
Law. 
 
5. Sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. (Article 99 of the Self–Defense 
Forces Act) 
 
6. International disaster relief activities, etc. (1987 revised 1992). 
Japan’s first international involvement was sending minesweepers to the Persian 
Gulf in the Gulf War of 1991.  From 1991 to February 2001, Japan participated in nine 
international support operations.  After September 11, 2001, that number increased two– 
fold and expanded globally (Figure 2).
54
  Proactively, Japan is seeking to contribute to 
peace.  Akiko Fukushima, a Japanese security expert, proposed a more accurate 
characterization of Japan’s aim as “Japan’s proactive peace and security strategies”, the 
title of a paper he wrote for the National Institute for Research Advancement.
55
  He 
argues that Japan is preparing itself to be more proactive in establishing its identity in the 
twenty–first century versus its historically reactive mode. 
Figure. 2 shows the record of activities by the Japanese Self–Defense Force 
(SDF) from 1991–2013.  These deployed forces were not always in permissible 
environments.  Japanese soldiers are subject to hostile fire.  In these cases, Japanese 
soldiers can defend themselves and themselves only.  However, the current Japanese 
Cabinet has reinterpreted the restriction on their forces.
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Figure 2.  Japanese Self–Defense Force Global Missions Post–September 11, 2001.56 
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Japan is placing more emphasis on its ability to defend its national interests 
through four groundbreaking policy shifts.  First, in December 2013, Japan published its 
first National Security Strategy.  This document lays out a clear strategy to protect its 
national interests; subtly announcing Japan will not let the international community 
marginalize or overlook Japan.  Prime Minister “Abe has stated even before the strategy’s 
release, “I will bring back a strong Japan. We simply cannot tolerate any challenge now, 
or in the future. No nation should underestimate the firmness of our [Japan’s] resolve.”57  
This has been a reoccurring theme in Japanese politics; however, this time the  
government introduced action with the rhetoric.” 58 
Second, Japan is markedly increasing funding for the SDF.  The Ministry of 
Defense has proposed the largest ever budget, $42 billion to the government, a 2.2 
percent increase from 2015.
59
  Japan is increasing the SDF’s aircraft, submarine, and 
surveillance capabilities.  Traditionally, the SDF’s budget has been limited to one percent 
of Japan’s gross national product, but this limit is not law.  Japan’s defense funding has 
more steeply increased since the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 (Figure 3).  
Japan is investing in military equipment that will allow Japan to extend its operational 
reach. 
Third, Japan has established a National Security Council.  At the same time Japan  
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Figure 3. Japanese Defense Spending and Significant Historical Events.
60
 
 
 
 
released its first National Security Strategy, Abe’s government announced this council’s 
establishment, to “undertake strategic discussions under the Prime Minister on a regular 
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basis and as necessary on various national security issues and exercising a strong political 
leadership.”61  The Ministry of Defense of Japan’s 2014 Annual White Paper:  Defense of 
Japan highlights that the council, is charged with: 
 deliberating Japan’s basic foreign and defense policies with regards to 
national security, 
 
 planning and coordination of basic direction and important matters of foreign 
and defense policies concerning Japan’s national security, using its general 
coordination authority, and, 
 
 during emergency situations, providing necessary recommendations from the 
perspective of foreign and defense policies concerning national security.
62
 
 
In addition to a new National Security Council, Japan’s Diet also passed a new “State  
Secrets Protection Law”.  This law’s focus is to protect state secrets affecting foreign 
policy.  It will also facilitate intelligence sharing with Japan’s allies.  Interestingly, the 
law will complicate declassification processes, especially on the subjects of codes, 
weapons, and intelligence gathering.  The law also limits access of Diet members to 
classified material to closed–door–committee meetings only.63 
In September 2015, the Diet passed two security laws that will ease the restrictive 
nature of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.   The Japan Times called the passage of 
these laws, “a watershed” event affecting Article 9 of the Constitution.64  These two laws 
depart from the common definition of Article 9 and the security treaty with the United 
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States, in which the United States is obligated to provide defense to Japan but Japan is 
not obligated to come to the defense of the United States if the United States is attacked.  
New laws have lifted many of the limitations on the Self–Defense Forces, allowing the 
SDF to deploy into more environments that are hostile and to provide for a collective 
self–defense.  Many in Japan believe that this move, strongly supported by the United 
States, will only support operations in which the United States is involved.  This move 
can also provide for a path for Japan to support Asian neighbors to confront any Chinese 
aggression in the East and South China Seas.  Ultimately, all of this combines to open the 
door to Japanese flirtation with, or outright embrace of, nuclear weapons. 
 
Postured for the Big Decision  
Over the course of seventy years, Japan has slowly reestablished and positioned 
itself to make more sound decisions on the nuclear weapon issue.  The Japanese’s 
defense budget ranks in the top ten of the world’s defense budget spending.65  The United 
States’ apparent retrenchment policy since 2008 leaves many Asian allies questioning the 
US’s commitment to the region.  China’s regional strength is steadily climbing, shifting 
the balance of power.  As China’s increasing power goes unchecked, along with other 
instability in the region, it is necessary for Japan to explore all available measures to 
defend its national security.  As Japan has matured since the end of World War II, it has 
effectively taken note of Kenneth Waltz’s third image, the anarchic international system.    
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The leaders of Japan since World War II have stated their determination to protect Japan 
by any means necessary.  In the last few decades, using nuclear weapons as one of those 
means has become less taboo.  In 2006, former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone stated, 
“There is a need to also study the issue of nuclear weapons….There are countries with 
nuclear weapons in Japan’s vicinity.”66 Former Prime Minister Tarō Asō stated that Japan 
cannot rely on the words of a nuclear power not to preemptively attack another country.  
He wondered, “if that’s a realistic way to ensure Japan’s safety.”67  Japan now has what it 
calls a “dynamic defense posture”.68  Japan may finally yield to the pressure from the 
United States to renounce the Article 9 as a mistake. 
Herman Kahn once predicted that Japan would become a nuclear weapon state, 
albeit the prediction was that Japan would go nuclear by the 1980s.
69
  Kahn may still be 
right yet, just a few decades off. 
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SHELTERING UNDER THE DECAYING UMBRELLA
70
 
 
The United States has provided extended nuclear deterrence to its allies from the 
start of the Cold War.  The United States has poured billions of dollars into its own 
nuclear enterprise, including the weapons, weapon platforms, support infrastructure, 
security, and its people.  Since the thaw of the Cold War, focus on nuclear weapons has 
lessened considerably, with a continuous erosion of the tangible and intangible facets of 
the nuclear enterprise.  The United States’ self–imposed restrictions gave rise to an aging 
program.  Organizations charged with maintaining and securing these weapons 
performed the mission well during the years of plenty; then as budgets became leaner, 
their mission execution started to falter.  Conflicting national policies compounded these 
issues.  Restrictions placed on the United States’ nuclear enterprise combined with 
‘nuclear fatigue’ and inconsistent policies, has caused Japan to ponder the credibility of 
the US nuclear umbrella. 
In 1992, the United States Congress passed legislation that prohibited 
underground nuclear testing.  The unilateral moratorium also resulted in the termination 
of any new weapon design development.
71
  Because of this moratorium, the National 
Nuclear Security Administration developed the Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan.  
This program places a high level of reliance on science and computers to certify the 
stockpile’s readiness.  However, computer simulations only receive twelve percent of the 
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total weapons activities budget of the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA).
72
  Bob Butterworth, writing for “Breaking Defense,” calls the certification 
process an “annual ritual” where various nuclear communities come together and tell 
each other that nuclear weapons will work “despite the complete absence of data” from 
“actual explosive performance.”73 
Since the last underground test, the United States has modified or altered seven 
active nuclear weapons.  The B–61 alone has been modified twelve times.  The original 
design life of a nuclear weapon is approximately thirty years, and because of the “no new 
weapon” moratorium, the NNSA created life extension programs (LEPs) in order to 
extend the service life of these weapons.  These LEPs modify the original production 
designs since the last test of the original designs and incorporate more modern 
components to replace sunset technology, such as replacing vacuum tubes with 
application–specific integrated circuits.  The NNSA is incorporating new techniques such 
as additive manufacturing in the LEP, but these techniques have not been tested or 
proven in nuclear detonations.
74
  As the NNSA conducts refurbishments, the Department 
of Energy’s Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan states that 
reused, remanufactured, and replacement components are incorporated to sustain the 
active arsenal.
75
  Currently, the certification of the United States’ nuclear stockpile hinges 
on computer simulations and the assessment of scientists with little to no underground 
testing experience.  Simulations through computer models and sub–critical tests will be 
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critical in future complex LEP efforts, despite the knowledge gap about plutonium’s 
behavior after the detonation of the primary stage of the weapon.
76
  National Nuclear 
Security Administration’s methods of management, refits, and certifications, call into 
question the reliability of these weapons to work as originally designed. 
Despite the effort of the Obama Administration’s modest attempt to improve the 
nuclear enterprise—a proposed $1 trillion investment over the next thirty years, the 
currently underfunded enterprise has already suffered atrophy of capabilities and neglect 
in infrastructure upkeep.
77
  Even with the proposed increase in the NNSA’s budget, this 
increase cannot buy experience in actual nuclear weapon detonation.  Some have even 
speculated that the current presidential administration views this investment as a means to 
decrease the nuclear arsenal further.
78
  This lack of commitment to modernization has led 
to severe issues of concern: crumbling structures, decreased capabilities, and outdated 
technology.  This carelessness can easily call into question the viability of the United 
States’ nuclear deterrence and credibility among those allies under the nuclear umbrella. 
The New York Times quotes Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona describing the national 
bomb complex as a “rundown garage.”79  While the New York Times compares the 
nuclear enterprise to Detroit’s auto industry.80  Nuclear silos are aging, developing water 
leaks, and equipped with decrepit equipment.  Many of the computer systems in the 
missile silos still rely on 1980s technology, utilizing large diskettes.  Other complexes 
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responsible for producing some of the most critical components date back to the 
Manhattan Project.  One of Tennessee’s representatives describes the conditions at Oak 
Ridge National Lab as equipment breaking down on a daily basis and employees having 
to wear personal protective gear to avoid injury from crumbling buildings.
81
  Some 
people in the National Nuclear Security Administration compare the modernization of the 
weapons and enterprise in terms of upgrading from vacuum tube technology to 
nanotechnology with no steps in between.  Since the Department of Energy lost its pit 
production plant in Colorado in 1996, it has not been able to produce more than ten pits a 
year and does not project to increase production until 2026.
82
  Pantex, the Department of 
Energy’s weapons assembly and disassembly plant, was unable to meet it dismantlement 
requirements in 2013 due to infrastructure issues.
83
  Los Alamos National Lab tapes 
together its decaying wastewater pipes and uses plastic bags as containment systems.
84
  
Security has also declined at nuclear facilities:  in 2012, an 82–year–old nun was able to 
breach the security at the weapons–grade uranium storage facility at Oak Ridge National 
Lab.
85
  None of this, of course, has escaped Japanese notice. 
Operational lapses in 2006 and 2007 left America’s allies, including Japan, 
wondering just how secure the nuclear arsenal is and whether the United States could be 
trusted to execute nuclear options if forced to.  The Chinese Government forced the US 
Government to reassure China that there was no intention to or attempt to develop a 
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Taiwanese nuclear capability.
86
  The Chinese expressed their concern over the possibility 
of the emergence of such a capability with terms like, “grave”, “disastrous 
consequences,” and “negative effects.”87 
President Obama—in spite of his legacy as an advocate of global nuclear zero and 
because of political negotiations to ratify the New START Treaty
88—has proposed a $1 
trillion nuclear budget to modernize the enterprise over the next thirty years.  The budget 
is to improve and construct buildings that produce critical nuclear components, develop 
and build new platforms for all three legs of the triad, fund life extension programs for all 
active nuclear weapon tail numbers, and develop interoperable warheads.  This proposal 
seems to conflict with national policy, specifically one of the Nuclear Posture Review’s 
five key objectives: “Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security 
strategy.”89  The Nuclear Posture Review also states that the United States will focus 
more on conventional forces for deterrence; meanwhile, the government has allowed 
budget cuts and sequestration to slash the overall defense budget by $600 million.
90
  If 
the national policy is to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons while simultaneously 
investing over $1 trillion in the enterprise and undertaking massive cuts in defense 
spending, how do United States allies react to these conflicting messages?  The nation’s 
allies expect unquestionable protection by the ‘nuclear umbrella’ and overwhelming 
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conventional forces; however, the United States cannot adequately maintain or support 
both sources of protection. In fact, by some projections, China will surpass the United 
States’ conventional force capacity in the next decade.  Allies, including Japan, wonder 
how their adversaries will react to a weaker United States. 
The task force charged with reporting on the Department of Defense’s Nuclear 
Weapons Management warns: “The continuing credibility of our nuclear deterrent is 
what assures a number of these countries that they do not need to develop their own 
nuclear weapons.  If the United States’ deterrent is perceived as less than credible, more 
technologically advanced nations among US allies could begin developing their own 
nuclear capabilities.”91 
In Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea are the recipients of American 
extended nuclear deterrence.  While no nations have attacked Japan or South Korea since 
being under the US extended nuclear deterrence umbrella, the causal relationship 
between the presence of the umbrella and the absence of an attack is patently impossible 
to demonstrate to a degree of certainty beyond the level of anecdote.  The pursuit of an 
independent nuclear deterrent in both Japan and South Korea is not new.  In the 1970s, 
South Korea explored the nuclear option because of changing US policy:  withdrawal of 
over 20,000 American troops, formalizing relations with China, and the United States’ 
exclusion of South Korea from nuclear planning.
92
  Under strong pressure from the 
United States Government, South Korea terminated its nuclear ambitions and ratified the 
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Treaty on the Non–Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  However, South Korean 
interest rekindled in 1977, when President Carter began withdrawing troops and tactical 
nuclear weapons from South Korea; and the interest has ebbed and flowed since.  Due to 
provocative actions by North Korea and perceived inaction by the United States, South 
Korea has questioned the credibility of America’s security commitment.  A poll 
conducted in 2013 indicated that two–thirds of South Koreans favored independently 
controlled nuclear weapons.
93
  This stance could also stem from the policies of the United 
States in its apparent indifference to North Korea’s demonstrated nuclear weapons 
program.  Because the United States deactivated the US Army’s 2nd Infantry Division in 
favor of rotational forces on the peninsula, while continuing to engage with China—a 
nation whose generals declare that North Korea has the right to possess and should 
possess nuclear weapons—South Korea is left wondering if its national security interests 
are of any concern to the United States.
94
  If South Korea were to reengage its quest for 
an independent nuclear deterrent, it could start a regional arms race that would include 
China, North Korea, South Korea—and, of course, Japan. 
The Government of Japan places a huge emphasis on the credibility of the 
deterrence the United States has extended.  As questions of the credibility of the United 
States’ nuclear enterprise arise, American policy has to reflect on the statement by 
Ambassador Yukio Satoh, “Japan’s adherence to the three non–nuclear principles 
depends largely, if not solely upon the capabilities and credibility of the Japan–United 
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States security treaty.”95  Japan’s shift on nuclear matters is a direct result of regional 
security issues, and senior Japanese officials have concerns about the credibility of 
United States’ nuclear program.96 
Japan has faced this credibility issues before with the retirement of the nuclear 
tipped Tomahawk Cruise Missile (TLAM/N).  Japan viewed these missiles as their 
specific extended deterrence assurance; it satisfied many of the aspects Japan expected in 
a deterrent, “flexible, credible, prompt, discriminate, stealthy or visible and sufficient for 
dissuasion.”97  Now with its security threats growing disproportionally compared the base 
of its assurance, Japan has reengaged the internal debate on a domestic nuclear weapons 
program. 
Japanese officials have stated officially and unofficially their opinions in favor of 
a nuclear weapons program.  In 2006, a report from the Japanese Government alluded to 
the possible development of a national nuclear weapons program.
98
  In addition to the 
technological knowledge, Japan also has enough plutonium for approximately 2,000 
weapons.
99
 
Conventional wisdom holds, by some accounts at least, that the prospect of 
international condemnation, significant economic and trade repercussions, and possible 
preemptive military action by a regional adversary keeps a non–nuclear nation’s nuclear 
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ambitions in check.  However, Japan may be willing to accept these risks and develop an 
indigenous weapons program. 
 
A “GRAY WAR” BUILDING IN NORTHEAST ASIA 
 
Japan’s Unruly Neighbors with Nuclear Capabilities or Ambitions 
The definition of Northeast Asia varies depending on topic or organization 
referenced.  Generally, this region includes Japan, China, South Korea, North Korea, and 
sometimes Mongolia, Russia, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.  Northeast Asian countries share 
many cultural commonalities.  However, the origins of some of these commonalities are 
results of the shared violent history.  Northeast Asia is a region with no shortage of 
international perplexities.  In this region, four countries are technically at war with each 
other: South Korea with North Korea and Japan with Russia.  The Korean War ended in 
an armistice with no formal peace treaty. Forty–eight of fifty participating countries in 
the World War II peace talks signed the formal peace treaty—The San Francisco Peace 
Treaty of 1951—except two countries: the Soviet Union and China.  In 1956, the Soviet 
Union and Japan signed a joint declaration whereby the two countries agreed to 
reestablish diplomatic relations and resolved some lingering post World War II issues.  
However, the joint declaration fell short of negotiating a formal peace treaty between the 
two nations, but the Joint Declaration did end the “state of war”.  Paragraph 9 of the Joint 
Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan (October 19, 1956) 
states, “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan agree to continue, after the 
restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist 
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Republics and Japan, negotiations for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty.”100  This places 
Russia and Japan in a situation where a state of war does not exist but there is no formal 
end to the war between the two countries.  China and Japan negotiated a formal peace 
treaty—Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Japan and the People’s Republic of 
China—in 1972.  Over the last 15 years, tensions in Northeast Asia have risen.  Much of 
the tension has revolved around what Japan calls ‘Gray–Zone’ issues.  These issues are 
“neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty, and maritime 
economic interest.”101  China refers to military operations other than war versus ‘Gray–
Zone’ issues; China includes “rights and interests protection and guard duty in this 
category”.102  Clearly these ‘operations’ relate to the disputed territorial claims between 
China and its neighbors.  Three of Japan’s neighbors pose a significate military threat to 
Japan.  All three of these threating neighbors possess nuclear weapons and are world 
leaders in one or more military hardware categories.  Russia and China, two threats to 
Japan, rank second and third, respectively, as the world’s most powerful militaries (Table 
1).  The nuclear threat, conventional threat, and provocative actions of North Korea, 
China, and Russia provide the Government of Japan with reasons to divert from idealism 
thinking to realism.  Indeed, one of the few constants in the region has been Japan’s 
commitment to pacifism. 
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Table 1. Global Rankings of Militaries of Japan, Russia, China, and North Korea.  Data 
are divided by global ranking, soldiers, tanks, fighter jets, nuclear weapons, aircraft 
carriers, submarines, and budget.
 103
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
                
Country 
Global 
Ranking 
Soldiers 
(million) 
Tanks Aircraft 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Aircraft 
Carriers 
Submarines 
Budget 
(billions) 
         
Japan 10 53.6 767 1,595 0 1* 16 $49.1 
         
Russia 2 69.01 15,000* 3,082* 8,484* 1* 63 $76.6 
         
China 3 749.6* 9,150 2,788 250 1* 69 $126.0* 
         
N. Korea 35 12.9 6,600 943 <10 0 78* $7.5 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
*Denotes regional leader. 
 
Provocative North Korea 
North Korea has become the ‘hermit kingdom’, an isolated and economically 
depressed country among the world’s fastest growing region.  In an effort to gain more 
sway among the international community and regional neighbors, North Korea has 
violated various international laws and norms, subjecting itself to sanctions and further 
isolation.  However, regime survival remains Kim Jong Un’s primary goal.  Kim Jong Un 
trusts very few people in his country and trusts even fewer outside North Korea.  North 
Korea will routinely use force or threaten to use force as a coercive tactic to receive 
inducements for temporary changes in policy.  Before Un’s father’s—Kim Jong–Il’s—
death, North Korea sank a South Korean warship and shelled a South Korean Island.  
These two provocations were warnings that the region and international community will 
not easily compel North Korea.  Un has made efforts diplomatically to develop a strategic 
                                                 
103
 Macias, Bender, and Gould. "The 35 Most Powerful Militaries”. 
 46 
relationship with China and Russia.
104
  These two relationships have borne some positive 
results for the recluse country. China is North Korea’s primary trade partner, with over 70 
percent of all of North Korea’s trade arriving from or departing to China.105  In 2012, 
Russia wrote off 90 percent of North Korea’s debt owed to Russia.106  Russia also 
provides much needed petroleum to North Korea.  China and Russia are becoming 
critical to North Korea, partly due to the mutual animosity they share for the United 
States and the United States’ allies.  North Korea views the United States, its actions, and 
those actions of the United States’ allies as a threat to regime survival.  This has directly 
provoked statements from North Korea toward Japan that indicated Japan should be “hit 
hard and sent to the bottom of the sea.”107  In order to support these threats North Korea 
focuses its efforts and limited resources on asymmetric military capabilities, WMD 
development, and missile development.  North Korea’s nuclear capability, conventional 
military, and provocative rhetoric cause Japan to view the North Korean threat potential 
very seriously. 
North Korea’s Nuclear Card.  North Korea’s nuclear program dates back to 
1959 when North Korea and the USSR signed a nuclear cooperation agreement, resulting 
in the opening of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in 1962.  North 
Korea researched and constructed a reprocessing plant to separate plutonium from spent 
                                                 
104
 The United States of America, Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and 
Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,” accessed November 1, 
2015, 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Report_to_Congress_on_Military_and_Security_Devel
opments_Involving_the_DPRK.pdf. 
105
 Natasha Schou, ed, Country Report North Korea. Rep. Country Report North Korea. (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2015), accessed 2015, www.eiu.com. (Hardcopy of document provided as part of DSS 
723 ‘Counter Proliferation’). 
106
 Japan, Ministry of Defense, Public Affairs, “Part I, Chapter 1, Section 2: Korean Peninsula,” (Defense 
of Japan 2015, Annual White Paper), 18-19, accessed September 5, 2015, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2015.html. 
107
 Ibid., 2. 
 47 
nuclear fuel at the Yongbyon site.  In 1985, North Korea signed the NPT.  Yet, in 1991, 
US Intelligence suspected North Korea was building a nuclear bomb.  North Korea 
threatened to withdraw from the in March 1993; however, North Korea suspended the 
withdrawal after 89 days.  In 1993, the Central Intelligence Agency informed President 
Clinton that North Korea might have one or two nuclear bombs. 
Current estimates place North Korea’s nuclear arsenal at less than ten, but the 
range is between five and fifteen.
108
  In the last couple of years, North Korea has placed 
an enormous focus on nuclear weapons.  Nuclear weapons are the keystone to the Kim 
regime’s survival.  Kim Jong Un is relying on nuclear weapons to deter all aggression 
toward North Korea.  The North Korean Government adopted a “New strategic line 
policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development.”109  In early 2013, Kim Jong 
Un solidified his stance and reliance on nuclear weapons when the government passed a 
new law, “On Consolidating the Position of Nuclear Weapons State for Self–Defense”, 
officially declaring North Korea a nuclear weapons state.
110
 
In addition to having nuclear weapons, North Korea has maintained and 
developed an advanced missile program.  North Korea’s missile capabilities include 
cruise missiles, intermediate range missiles, medium range missiles, and possibly 
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intercontinental ballistic missiles.  Most of these missiles are capable of ranging Japan, 
and pose a grave threat to the main islands of Japan (Figure 4).  Increasing this threat is 
the possibility that North Korea has overcome the hurdle of miniaturizing.
111
  
Miniaturizing would provide North Korea the ability to mate a nuclear warhead to a 
missile, increasing the lethality of North Korea’s missile arsenal. 
Japan’s Ministry of Defense summarizes the North Korean nuclear threat as 
follows: 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, considered in conjunction with 
North Korean efforts to enhance ballistic missile capabilities, including extending 
the range of ballistic missiles that could become the delivery vehicles of WMDs, 
poses a grave threat to Japan’s security and significantly impairs peace and 
stability in Northeast Asia and the international community.  Therefore, they 
[North Korean nuclear weapons] can never be tolerated.
112
 
 
The combination of successful nuclear tests, ballistic missile launches, and possible 
miniaturization capability presents a clear threat to the Japanese and its neighbors. 
In terms of manpower, North Korea has the fourth largest army in the world.  
Estimates of active duty soldiers range between 960,000–1.2 million and an additional 6 
million–7.2 million in reserves or ‘home guard’ type forces.  Even with limited natural 
resources and infrastructure, North Korea has limitedly improved its tank and artillery 
equipment.  The air force is composed of legacy Soviet aircraft.  In 1999, North Korea 
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Figure 4. North Korean Missiles and Ranges.
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procured MiG–21s from Kazakhstan; these would be North Korea’s newest aircraft. 
Some reports indicate North Korea has either acquired or domestically produced 
unmanned aerial vehicles similar to those produced by United States companies like 
Raytheon.  The increasing age of the Soviet era aircraft has forced North Korea to rely 
heavily on air defense capabilities.  North Korea has developed a robust air defense 
system with overlapping systems, most likely procured from China and Russia.  The 
North Korean navy has received the least modernization.  However, this branch has 
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undertaken what may be the most provocative and concerning acts.  North Korea has 
invested in its submarine fleet.  The North’s submarine fleet, the largest submarine fleet 
in the world, consists of diesel and midget submarines.  In 2010, a North Korean 
submarine managed to approach a South Korean warship and sank it with an 
indigenously produced torpedo.  The biggest game changer, if the reports are true, is the 
possible submarine launch of a ballistic missile from a North Korean submarine.  This 
could indicate that North Korea is within two to five years of a submarine–launched 
nuclear capability.  This capability, in the hands of an irrational regime, will increase the 
possibility of unintended escalation and miscalculation within the region. 
Japan has to maintain a watchful eye on North Korea.  The Government of Japan 
believes that North Korea cannot remain unchecked; containment will not work in North 
Korea.  North Korea’s unchallenged pursuit of nuclear–armed missiles poses an 
existential threat to Japan.  Japan shifted its political ideology more toward realism, but 
Japan still needs to develop some capability to deter North Korea. 
 
China Rising 
China has been weary of the United States’ involvement in East Asia.  To counter 
this encroachment, China has been modernizing its military over the last two decades.
114
  
As a result, China’s defense budget has had double–digit increases.  The upgrades have 
concentrated on China’s ability to wage asymmetric war and exercise Anti–Access/Area–
Denial (A2/AD) in the maritime domain.  Japan views China actions as “attempts to 
change the status quo by coercion”, and makes “unilateral assertions without making any 
                                                 
114
 James J. Przystup, “Japan-China Relations 2005-2010: Managing Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” 
Strategic Perspectives 12, (October 2012): 6. 
 51 
compromises.”115  In an effort to be the primary and only country of influence in East 
Asia, China is basing their rise and influence on economic and military power, pushing 
the United States out of the region. 
At present, China already has a huge economic influence in East Asia.  China 
holds a lot of sway over North Korea diplomatically and economically.  China accounts 
for over 71 percent of North Korea’s exports and 76 percent of North Korea’s imports.  
Among the other 29 East Asia and Pacific region countries—as defined by the US 
Department of State—China ranks among the top five importers of 90 percent of the 
countries, and China is among the top five of 63 percent of the countries’ exports.116  
China also buys a lot of the world’s debt, providing even more economic power over not 
only countries in the region but also globally, including the United States. 
China’s primary focus and reason for building its military capabilities is to protect 
 and extend its territorial integrity and sovereignty.  China’s secondary focus is to gain a 
global presence.
117
  China now has the economic ability to coerce many of the East Asian 
countries.  China is continuing to develop its military in order to apply additional 
pressure to its Asian neighbors, if required.  Most of China’s defense doctrine is Taiwan–
centric.
118
  Nevertheless, China’s doctrine is multipurpose; the premise of this doctrine 
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also applies to the territorial dispute with Japan.  The 2015 Chinese Defense Whitepaper 
assigns the following tasks to the military:  “safeguard the sovereignty and security of 
China’s territorial land, air and sea; safeguard China’s security and interests in new 
domains; safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests; maintain strategic 
deterrence and carry out nuclear counterattack” among other tasks.119   
Increases in economic and military instruments of state power, combined with the 
recent aggressive behavior exhibited by China have contributed to marginalizing the 
United States.  By minimalizing the United States’ influence in the region, many 
countries in the region, like Japan, are more vulnerable to coercion and exploitation by 
the Chinese. 
 
Senkaku / Diaoyu Maritime Conflict 
Both China and Japan are huge consumers of energy and are heavily dependent 
on foreign oil.  In 1968, the United Nations conducted various geological surveys in the 
East China Sea.
 120
  The survey indicated the seabed surrounding the islands, known as 
the Senkaku and Diaoyu by the Japanese and Chinese respectively, may contain oil 
(Figure 5).  The survey estimated the seabed might contain forty–five years of oil for 
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Figure 5.  Disputed Islands in Northeast Asia
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China.
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Two years after the geological survey, the claims and counterclaims between 
China and Japan began.  In the early 2000s, compromise seemed possible because both 
countries agreed to a joint exploration venture.  As the years passed, any joint venture 
seemed less likely because disagreements on sovereignty have increased.  The dispute 
became more physical in 2010, when China pursued the Japanese vessel Shoyo in the 
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disputed area.  Later that year, Japanese Coast Guard ships interdicted a Chinese fishing 
trawler and apprehended the captain and crew for violating Japanese territorial waters.
123
  
This incident led to increased maritime patrols by both nations as well as additional air 
patrols.  In December 2012 and January 2013, China deployed reconnaissance aircraft 
into the disputed area.  Japanese fighters alerted and responded to the Chinese incursion 
in December (Figure 6).  In January, Chinese fighters escorted the reconnaissance 
aircraft; however, these planes did not cross into the disputed airspace.  At the end of 
January, a Chinese naval frigate engaged a Japanese destroyer.  On November 23, 2013, 
China established an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) which overlaps Japan’s 
ADIZ (Figure 7). China is competing with its neighbors who are in turn hedging in effort 
to “establish dominion over China and its [Chinese] interests.”124  Over the last two 
decades, China has provided double–digit increases to its defense spending, increases 
focused on building–up and modernizing the military, including China’s nuclear arsenal.  
For Japan, the greatest military threats from China are missiles, naval power, and nuclear 
weapons.  
China’s Second Artillery Forces is the primary nuclear and conventional missile 
unit for the People’s Liberation Army.  As evidenced by the increases to China’s missile 
capabilities modernization and focus on area denial doctrine, the Second Artillery Forces 
have received a considerable portion of the Chinese defense budget.  China has acquired 
missiles from foreign sources and developed other missiles domestically.  
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Figure 6. Number of Japanese Air Self–Defense Force Alerts.125 
 
Figure 7. Overlapping Air Defense Identification Zones.
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The focus of missile acquisition has been anti–ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and land 
attack cruise missiles (LACM).  These two classes of missiles directly support China’s 
Anti–Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) doctrine and increase the calculus of any country 
attempting to spar with China. 
The Chinese can use these missiles outside of the Taiwan–centric doctrine as a 
coercive tool, holding potential Japanese targets at risk.  The majority of China’s cruise 
and ballistic missiles are conventional.  However, if China employs a sufficient quantity 
of missiles against key economic, command and control, and industrial nodes in Japan, 
conventional missiles will take on a similar existential threat similar to the threat from 
Chinese nuclear weapons.  Chinese nuclear ballistic missiles are not the only reason 
Japan has invested heavily into ballistic missile defense systems.  China has developed 
and continues to develop a variety of missiles for the Chinese Army, Navy, and Air 
Force, increasing the commitment of the entire Chinese military to the A2/AD strategy. 
The Japanese know that China has targeted Japan with nuclear weapons.  The 
Chinese objected to a Japanese missile defense program, “Beijing has argued that 
Japanese participation [in theater missile defense] would undermine China’s deterrent”, 
Japanese experts “have logically concluded from this that China must therefore target 
Japan with nuclear weapons.”127  China’s nuclear–tipped ballistic missiles pose the most 
significant threat to Japan.  China maintains short–range, medium–range, intermediate–
range, submarine–launched, and intercontinental ballistic missiles, most of which can 
range the islands of Japan (Figure 8).  Current United States Defense estimates state 
China has 50–60 intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable 
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re–entry vehicle capability.128  Without a doubt, China’s nuclear–armed missiles do pose 
an existential threat to Japan. 
Protecting Chinese maritime territories and sovereignty is one of China’s prime 
national security interests.  Naval power is a primary focus of the Chinese government.  
In China’s 2015 Defense Whitepaper, China states, “The seas and oceans bear on the 
enduring peace, lasting stability and sustainable development of China.  The traditional 
mentality [of the Chinese] that land outweighs sea must be abandoned…”129  
In early 2015—James Holmes estimated that the Chinese defense budget should 
have reached $180 billion by the end of 2014; the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s130 
portion of that budget was unknown.  However, he believes the Navy’s share was 
substantial.
131
 
With 870 naval ships, 190 considered combat vessels and 60 submarines, China is 
on pace to surpass the naval fleet of the United States by 2020.
132
  China commissioned 
its first aircraft carrier in 2012.  A Chinese civilian purchased the carrier, an unfinished 
soviet legacy warship, from the Ukraine in 1998.
133
  China now has two additional 
aircraft carries under construction.
134
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Figure 8. Chinese Missile Ranges.
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With a focus on gaining parity with the United States Navy, China has a goal of 
completing three aircraft carriers by 2020.  These three carriers will patrol the East and 
South China Seas and increase the tensions in the territorial disputed areas.  China’s 
aircraft carriers will outnumber its neighbors’ by three to one.  To round out its naval 
power, China has been building up its amphibious and naval logistics capabilities.   These 
increases to China’s Navy directly support and counteract China’s neighbors’ 
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“provocative actions” on and around “China’s reefs [South China Sea] and islands [East 
China Sea] that they have illegally occupied.”136 
China’s naval and missile expansions are only two areas of military power that 
are of concern to Japan.  Clearly, these two elements of military power combined with 
the remaining parts of the Chinese military would easily overwhelm the Japanese Self–
Defense Force, as it currently exists.  Left unchallenged China will outpace and replace 
the United States in North East Asia.  China’s rise will justify its neighbors’ reasons for 
attempting to self–help as hedge and against Chinese dominance.  Based on China’s 
current expansions, its neighbors are justifiably concerned and provide reason to improve 
their military posture and national defense. 
 
Russia:  The Regional Wildcard 
After entering into a hibernation phase immediately after the end of the Cold War, 
the Russian bear is awake.  Russian President Vladimir Putin is forcing the world to 
reconsider its perception of Russia as a minor player in global affairs.  After September 
11, 2001, and the Global War on Terrorism, Russia seemed to be marginalized and 
relegated to the annuals of Cold War history.  Still struggling to adjust to a new system of 
government, legacy ideologies of the Soviet era began to resurface.  Russian President 
Putin has been instrumental in leading these ideologies.  Putin’s primary focus has been 
to reclaim Russia’s perceived glory during the Soviet years.  Putin has attempted to 
restart the Cold War with aggressive moves in former Soviet Union countries, threats 
toward North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, and making friends with former 
                                                 
136
 The People's Republic of China, Ministry of National Defense, The State Council Information Office of 
the People's Republic of China, “National Security Situation,” White Papers, Edited by Zhang Tao, May 
26, 2015, accessed November 5, 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/index.htm.  
 60 
adversaries, like China.  Most of Russia’s attention has focused on Eastern Europe and 
recently Southwest Asia.  Nevertheless, the potential for Russian involvement in other 
regions is high.  Russia is beginning to refocus spending on its military.  Putin has placed 
more emphasis on the readiness of military units, missile defense, and nuclear weapons.  
The Japanese Ministry of Defense reports that Russia is modernizing “its equipment and 
invest[ing] about 20 trillion rubles (about 46 trillion yen) [or $37 billion] to increase its 
percentage of new equipment up to 70 percent by 2020.”137 With marginal strategic focus 
in Northeast Asia but the potential for a large strategic impact, Russia remains a wildcard 
in Northeast Asia. 
Russia and Japan are technically still at war with each other; Russia and Japan 
never signed a formal peace treaty to ended World War II.  Four islands off the northern 
coast of Hokkaido are one of several reasons Russia has not signed the peace treaty, but 
highlights a reoccurring regional theme causing increased tensions among neighbors.
138
 
These islands, similar to the Senkaku islands, have cause many issues between Russia 
and Japan (figure 5).  Russia routinely conducts military drills on the islands and in 
September of 2014, Russia pledged to continue further development of the islands for the 
military over the next decade.
139
  As late as June 2015, Russia has stated construction of 
military facilities on the islands will increase.
140
  Further development of these islands 
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provides Russia with additional capabilities to project operational reach.  These facilities 
will provide Russia with additional logistic lines of communications and staging bases for 
force projection into Northeast Asia.  President Putin feels that his country has to “turn 
toward Asia to gain more confidence and become less vulnerable to these aggressive 
attacks [by the US].”141  As Russia ‘pivots’ to Asia, opportunities will develop to further 
build cooperation with China and possibly North Korea.  These two countries oppose the 
United States’ actions in the region and the corresponding actions of the United States’ 
allies.  While pivoting toward Asia, Russia can obtain resources and technologies that the 
West has denied Russia—since Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine—while providing 
China and North Korea with energy resources both countries require.
142
  In addition to 
energy exports to China and North Korea, Russia is in the process of supplying China 
with updated military hardware.  In late 2014, military sales negotiations were underway 
for the delivery of Su–45 fighters, possibly Amur–1650 submarine, and satellite 
components to China, a striking change of policy by the Russians from the days of 
refusing to sell China state–of–the–art military hardware.143  These trades, if completed, 
will increase China’s capabilities in the East China Sea, increase China’s ability to coerce 
neighbors, and become the dominate force in Northeast Asia. 
Russia is also playing a direct role in regional instability.  As a sign of flexing 
military muscle, Russia deployed a guided missile cruiser through the Soya Strait in 
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September 2011; the first time since the Cold War ended.
144
 The Russian navy deployed 
two of its newest nuclear submarines to the Pacific Fleet in December 2013 and 2014.  
Also in late 2014, Russia deployed multiple vessels from its Baltic and Black Sea Fleets 
to the South China Sea.
145
  These vessels, Japanese reports assess, may have  been 
involved in Russia’s 2014, exercise “Vostok 2014”.  Japan has referred to this exercise as 
the “largest and the most important Russian Armed Forces’ exercises and drills 
conducted that year [2014]” involving “over 155,000 personnel, over 4,000 combat 
vehicles, about 80 vessels, and about 630 aircraft.”146  During this exercise and shortly 
after it, Russian naval vessels transited through the Soya Strait and Tsushima Strait both 
within close proximity of Japan.  Russia has also used its military aircraft in this new 
show of force.  In 2014, Japanese Air Self–Defense Forces alerted and responded to 473 
Russian aircraft in Japanese airspace (Figure 6).
147
  This is almost four times as many 
intercepts as in 2003, and is in addition to Chinese intercepts discussed earlier. 
Russia has a ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy and has resourced it—in contrast to the 
United States’ ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy, which has not seen any noticeable investment to 
the region.  Russia’s non–traditional actions in Northeast Asia forces countries like Japan 
to contemplate unknown variables, with no historical references with which to base  
future strategy. 
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Summary 
Japan is in a neighborhood with rising powers and rising tensions.  Of these 
neighbors, Japan is still formally at war with Russia—despite the 1956 joint 
declaration— has territorial disputes with two, is routinely provoked by three, and is 
economically tied to most of the countries that make up the region.  The three primary 
threats to Japan have one thing in common; the countries posing the threats all have 
nuclear weapons and pose an existential threat to Japan.  Up to now, Japan has relied on 
the United States’ power and position in the region to contain aggressive moves made by 
North Korea, China, and Russia.  However, China and Russia are developing policies that 
degrade the United States’ influence in the region and increase the level of fear in Japan.  
If Japan does not diversify and increase its instruments of state power, Japan will be 
marginalized and be susceptible to coercion by North Korea, China, and Russia. 
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JAPAN AND THE NUCLEAR NON–PROLIFERATION REGIME 
 
Since the end of the World War II, Japan has been the world’s strongest advocate 
for the disarmament and banning of nuclear weapons—a perfectly natural stance for a 
non–nuclear state that suffered two nuclear attacks.  In the international community, 
Japan has led the non–proliferation movement since it ratified the NPT148.  The NPT has 
been the cornerstone of non–proliferation for the last forty–seven years.  Most scholars 
argue that the treaty is one of the primary reasons Japan has remained a non–nuclear 
weapon state.  However, the pressures acting against this international norm could be one 
of the growing reasons Japan may decide to cross the nuclear threshold.   From Japan’s 
initial reluctance to ratify the treaty, to the ascension of non–signatory nuclear states, to 
the recent Non–Proliferation Treaty Review Conference failures, Japan’s confidence in 
the treaty has been and is in question. 
 
Hesitant to Commit 
Even as the ink of Japan’s signature on the treaty was drying in 1970, Prime 
Minister Sato’s government had commissioned a secret investigation into the costs and 
benefits of an indigenous nuclear weapons program.  This secret inquiry came at the start 
of a six–year hesitation period between Japan’s signature and ratification of the NPT; 
showing even in the beginning, and demonstrated from the very beginning that domestic 
policy indicated differing attitudes from its publicly proclaimed international stance.  The 
first part of the study started less than four years after China’s first nuclear detonation.  
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George H. Quester states that the Japanese Government had concerns over the economic 
cost, difficulties in controlling the plutonium it produced, industrial espionage, and 
overbearing inspections.
149
  Prior to ratification, all documentation concerning Japan’s 
Nuclear program utilized Japanese language and writing.  The government was 
concerned that the cost to convert and translate documentation and processes would 
burden the civilian nuclear industry, making the program less economically affordable.
150
  
As required by accepting the terms of the NPT, accounting for 98 percent of the produced 
plutonium would also be an economic burden on the Japanese nuclear industry.  The 
Japanese were more concerned that the remaining unaccounted for two percent plutonium 
could still provide enough special nuclear material to produce a nuclear device.  Japan 
wanted the same exemptions and exceptions as had been afforded to Euratom (Europe’s 
Atomic Group).  This would ease the burden of inspections; insuring reactors could run 
more optimally with less down time.  Less intrusive inspections would also lessen the 
potential for industrial espionage.  In addition to these four commercial concerns, 
politically, Japan viewed the treaty as a tool that would treat the country as a “second–
class loser of World War II.”151 Most importantly, the Japanese realized that by not 
ratifying the treaty, they would not have access to the exchange of nuclear technologies, 
as afforded by Articles IV and V of the treaty.   Although ratifying would legally prevent 
Japan from pursuing a weapon, Articles IV and V enable the country to maintain current 
technologies that could facilitate the development of a latent nuclear weapons program or 
the rapid development of a more overt weapons program. 
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Although a 1972 poll indicated that only 45 percent of the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party felt “Japan should absolutely not arm itself with nuclear weapons”,152 
Japan ratified the Non–Proliferation Treaty in 1976 with the condition that “no other 
states would openly declare a nuclear weapon capability.”153  Since then, this condition 
has been broken at least four times by India, South Africa, Pakistan, and North Korea.  
Israel, not an openly declared nuclear state is widely accepted and ignored.  The NPT 
allows for five nuclear states. A nuclear state under NPT is a state “which has 
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon . . . prior to 1 January 1967”;154 and non–
nuclear states are everyone else.  Since India, Pakistan, and Israel never signed the NPT, 
they suffered little if at all—even though the two countries were subject to sanctions and 
various diplomatic restrictions—when they revealed their programs or detonated their 
first weapon.  
 
NPT Erosion and Japan 
Article I of the NPT specifically states that nuclear–weapon states that are 
signatories of the treaty may not “in any way  assist, encourage, or induce any non–
nuclear–weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.”155  
However, international accommodations to nuclear non–signatory states have arguably 
provided Japan with incentives to reevaluate its non–nuclear weapon state status. 
In 2005, US President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh announced the agreement between the two nations that would provide assistance to 
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the Indian civilian nuclear energy program.
156
  This agreement between a ‘nuclear–
weapon state’ and ‘non–nuclear–weapon state’, not to mention a non–signatory to the 
treaty, indirectly legitimized India’s nuclear weapons program, and discredited the first 
article of the NPT.  According to the Council on Foreign Relations, it also provided the 
bases for other NPT signatures and weapon–states to “bend the international rules”.157  
The US Congress provided final approval to the agreement with India on October 1, 
2008.  As an interesting corollary, India’s and Japan’s prime ministers have since agreed 
to expedite their negotiations on a civil nuclear cooperation deal.  Moreover, Japan has 
removed six of India’s space– and defense–related entities from Japan’s Foreign End–
User List.  This move will allow India and Japan to “enter into transactions involving 
sensitive dual–use equipment, technology, and software.”158  Some NPT experts believe 
deals like these serve only to “gut the agreement”.159  One might also be pardoned for 
wondering what they mean about the depth of commitment that the United States, India, 
and Japan have toward nuclear non–proliferation. 
North Korea, once a party to the NPT, is the only nation that has invoked Article 
X, allowing parties to withdraw from the treaty.  In recent years, countries in North East 
Asia and the United States have done little to disarm North Korea or encourage North 
Korea to abandon its program.  Though sanctioned by the international community, the 
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international community is tacitly accepting
160
 North Korea as a NPT non–complier, or 
“gray state”.161  North Korea has taken advantage of the NPT’s peaceful civilian pursuit 
articles and covertly developed a weapons program while the international community 
has only implemented half-hearted sanctions on the country.  The United States calls this 
“strategic patience” while Japan grows more nervous with every North Korean 
provocation and less confident in the international system.
162
  Even China—one of 
Japan’s rivals in North East Asia and a permeant member of the United Nations Security 
Council—continues to shelter and trade with the North Korea.163 
Similarly, the P5+1, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council—United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, China—plus the non–
permanent member Germany,  have negotiated nuclear accommodations with Iran, 
another ‘gray state’ of a different hue.  The agreement could yet prove to be another 
shock to the NPT especially if countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt diverge 
from their peaceful civilian nuclear programs.  Perhaps the lesson for Japan is:  to suffer 
through nuclear sanctions is a potentially viable path to acceptance as a new nuclear state, 
regardless of the state’s status as a NPT signatory. 
In 2014, 158 countries participated in the third Conference on the Humanitarian 
Impact of Nuclear Weapons.  This conference explored three main areas associated with 
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the impacts of nuclear weapons:  the potential humanitarian consequences of a 
detonation; human and technical factors that could lead to use; and the norms and 
international law related to the humanitarian consequences.
164
 Notable attendees of the 
conference were the United States, United Kingdom, Pakistan, India, and Japan.  
Noticeably absent were three of the five NPT nuclear states—Russia, China, and 
France—and two non–signatory states with known or suspected nuclear weapons–Israel 
and North Korea.  The Austrian Government, which led the conference, crafted a pledge 
that would do the following:  “promote the protection of civilians” (in relation to the 
threat posed by nuclear weapons); urge NPT parties to renew commitment to Article VI; 
nuclear weapons states to take measure to reduce the possibility of use; and finally, 
cooperate with all stakeholders to “stigmatise, prohibit and eliminate nuclear 
weapons.”165 As of July 14, 2015, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear 
Weapons’ website claims those signing the pledge include113 non–nuclear countries, and 
none of the states known to have nuclear weapons.
166
  Though not legally binding, the 
Austria Pledge
167
 only reemphasizes the parties to the NPT obligatory commitment to 
Article VI:  “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures” to stop the arms 
race and to disarm completely.
168
  As one examines the list of pledge signatures further, 
the signature of one of the major advocates of the NPT and nuclear disarmament is 
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missing Japan.  In The Japan Times, an unnamed Japanese government official stated, 
“The time is not yet ripe for negotiating”, and the Japanese Foreign ministry says the 
Austrian Pledge “crosses a red line.”169 However, The Japanese government did not 
specify exactly what it considered the “red line” to be. After one of the 2015 NPT review 
preparatory meetings in 2013, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary told The Japan Times, 
Japan could not sign the pledge due to “the security environment in which the country 
[Japan] is placed.”170  According to fellow conference delegates, Japan’s main concern 
was the “under any circumstances” clause relating to the affirmation that no one will use 
nuclear weapons again.
171
  This is despite the fact that every year Japan appeals to the 
United Nations General Assembly to eliminate nuclear weapons.
172
  These actions 
relating to the pledge are additional indications that Japan maybe distancing itself from 
its past patronage of the NPT and establishing a new norm in its nuclear policy.  Japan 
still wants the United States’ nuclear umbrella and for the United States to have the 
flexibility to use nuclear weapons to protect Japan.  Japan remains a nuclear threshold 
state, while indigenously adapting its nuclear policies.  This pledge, if signed by the 
United States and Japan, would undermine the credibility of any United States nuclear 
deterrent; however, not affirming to or supporting the pledge weakens the legitimacy of 
the NPT.  Failure to garner support for the pledge foreshadowed the failure of the follow–
on NPT Review Conference in mid–2015. 
                                                 
169
 Kyodo, “Because of U.S. Nuclear Umbrella, Japan Not to Support Austrian Document Seeking Atomic 
Weapons Ban,” The Japan Times, March 13, 2015, sec. National / Politics, accessed August 3, 2015, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/13/national/politics-diplomacy/because-of-u-s-nuclear-
umbrella-japan-not-to-support-austrian-document-seeking-atomic-weapons-ban/#.vmc1rm-fpiv. 
170
 “Japan Refuses to Back Statement Against A-Bombs,” The Japan Times, April 26, 2013, sec. National 
News, accessed June 30, 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/26/national/japan-refuses-to-
back-statement-against-a-bombs/#.va6etwgpcpo. 
171
 Ibid. 
172
 Kyodo, “Because of U.S. Nuclear Umbrella”. 
 71 
The most recent threat to the legitimacy and strength of the NPT was the 2015 
NPT Review Conference.  Since the treaty first went into effect in 1970, the review 
conference occurs every five years.  Two of the last three reviews, 2005 and 2015, failed 
to produce an agreed final declaration.  Harald Müller called the 2005 review failure “the 
biggest failure in the history of this Treaty.”173  The 2005 review conference failed 
largely due to irreconcilable positions on procedural processes in attempting to force 
national interest items into the conference.
174
  The United States was not providing the 
traditional leadership role.  The United States delegation consisted of lower level 
government personnel, signaling a dismissive attitude toward the importance of the 
conference and treaty.  Müller notes that the European Union filled the role as the 
conference leader.  China was cozy with those countries with which it foresees future 
economic relations and dependencies.  The conference ended with a weakened treaty and 
no final agreements made.  This failed conference does not provide non–nuclear states 
and the non–signatory states any incentives either to disarm or not to pursue a weapons 
program.  Müller cautions that in the next decade (2020s) the failure of this conference 
could spark the cascading proliferation feared in the early 1960s.  He draws attention 
specifically to “alarmist statements from Key Japanese politicians.”175 
The 2010 review conference resulted in an agreed final document and an 
obligatory recommitment to Article VI.  However, the conference concluded with China 
and the United States having not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and no real 
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progress toward arms reduction.  A gap still exists in the overall commitment to the 
treaty’s pillars.  This conference may have received a boost from the 2008 Wall Street 
Journal commentary by George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam 
Nunn, as well as from President Obama’s 2009 Prague Speech, both supporting a “Global 
Zero” initiative.  Nevertheless, this boost lasted for less than five years.  The 2015 review 
reverted to the failed 2005 review and further weakened the NPT.  Weapons of mass 
destruction and the development of a nuclear weapons free zone or weapons of mass 
destruction free zone in the Middle East was the center of the failure.  This issue arose in 
both 2005 and 2010, and both times the conference delayed the issue or ‘kicked it down 
the road’.  In 2010, the conference agreed to convene a conference in 2012 addressing the 
weapons of mass destruction fee zone in the Middle East.
176
  The 2012 conference did not 
occur due to multiple issues, mainly the ‘Arab Spring’ and other issues like water and 
energy scarcity, economic hardships, and rising unemployment.
177
  This issue carried 
over to the 2015 NPT review and caused a stalemate resulting in the failure of a second 
review in fifteen years.  According to the Canada Free Press, the demands made by the 
Arab League made any consensus all but impossible.
178
  National interests have now 
derailed a second NPT review over interests of the greater good that the treaty could 
provide. 
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The Third Image Reality 
Japan has overtly hedged its survival on the international norming of the NPT.  
However, like the third image of Kenneth Waltz’s Man the State and War, the NPT also 
provides for an avenue for anarchy to evolve.
179
 Japan’s hope is that its support of the 
NPT will draw more support among the international community, resulting in a stronger 
norm supported by an international system that will bring about global nuclear 
disarmament.  However, as Waltz observes, “States do not enjoy even imperfect 
guarantee of their security unless they set out to provide it for themselves.”180  The 
Japanese newspaper Mainichi goes as far as to claim, “The treaty operates on the unfair 
premise that whoever possesses nuclear weapons gains the upper hand.”181  The United 
States, Japan’s closest ally, may be the biggest culprit to the failing NPT.  Former US 
President Jimmy Carter wrote, 
The United States is the major culprit in this erosion of the NPT. While claiming 
to be protecting the world from proliferation threats in Iraq, Libya, Iran and North 
Korea, American leaders not only have abandoned existing treaty restraints but 
also have asserted plans to test and develop new weapons, including anti–ballistic 
missiles, the earth–penetrating "bunker buster" and perhaps some new "small" 
bombs.
182
 
 
President Carter further noted a United Nations report that stated, “We are approaching a 
point at which the erosion of the non–proliferation regime could become irreversible and 
                                                 
179
 Waltz’s third image discusses how the anarchic structure of the international system leads to conflict or 
war.  A sovereign state relies on established rules of law to maintain a certain level of order via an 
established law enforcement body.  In the international system the established rules of law have no 
enforcement mechanisms; allowing states to deviate from the norm without fear of sever reproductions.  In 
this case, the will of one state can impose on the will of another state; resulting in anarchy or for Waltz, war 
or conflict.  Failure of the NPT can result in a state or group of states pursuing their own will, will thus 
impose anarchy on the ardent proponents of the treaty.  
180
 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Third Image: International Conflict and International Anarchy,” Essay. In Man, 
the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (Chichester, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001), 201. 
181
 Takao Yamada, “Japan Political Pulse: Rational Alternatives to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” 
The Mainichi: Japan Political Pulse, The Mainichi Newspapers, January 24, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, 
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/perspectives/news/20150124p2a00m0na004000c.html. 
182
 Jimmy Carter, “Saving Nonproliferation.” The Washington Post, March 28, 2005, sec. A–World, A-17, 
accessed October 5, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/a5754-2005mar27.html. 
 74 
result in a cascade of proliferation."
183
  With the breakdown of two of the last three NPT 
reviews and the lack of recommitment to disarmament, Japan is beginning forced by 
international anarchy to remilitarize—this time, with a nuclear weapon capability. 
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MORE THAN A LATENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM 
 
Japan is one of the world’s most innovative countries.  Japan has had a civilian 
nuclear program since 1954, and has been reprocessing spent nuclear fuel for over thirty 
years.
184
  That program has evolved and prior to the earthquake and tsunami in 2011, 
accounted for thirty percent of Japan’s total energy production.185  With Japan’s 
experience, large civilian nuclear capability, ancillary weapons program capabilities, and 
evolving nuclear policies, Japan’s latent nuclear weapons program could transform in a 
short timeframe. 
 
The Forgotten Japanese Weapons Program 
Japan experimented with atomic weapons during World War II.  Under the 
direction of Japanese scientist, Yoshio Nishina the “Ni–go” Research program was 
established and development of an atomic bomb for Japan began under the Imperial 
Japanese Army.  Ni–Go was the army’s weapon program and completed for resources 
with the Imperial Japanese Navy’s research program, “F–go”.186  Nuclear propulsion was 
ostensibly the Navy’s research focus vice nuclear weapons.  Yet, evidence exists that 
Japan’s navy may have explored atomic weapons also.187  Disrupted by Allied aerial 
bombing, the Japanese army program relocated the program from the main islands of 
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Japan.  Some reports speculate the program relocated to Hungnam (now part of North 
Korea) in order to produce heavy water.
188
  Evidence of foreign support also exists.  In 
the South China Sea, the Allies captured a Nazi submarine carrying 560 kilograms of 
uranium oxide.
189
  The Ni–go program received heavy damage because of a bombing raid 
over Tokyo.  After Japan’s surrender, US forces discovered and destroyed the cyclotrons 
and dumped them in Tokyo Harbor.  A captured Japanese intelligence officer provided 
reporter David Snell information on a successful atomic test.
190
  Snell’s informant 
indicated that the weapon was really a crude device.  Japanese rushed to test a device 
after it learned that the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan only days before Japan’s 
surrender.
191
 
 
Three Studies and No Program—Yet 
Since World War II, the Japanese have explored the nuclear option at least three 
times.
192
  The first study started in 1968 and concluded in 1970.  This study, also referred 
to as The 68/70 Internal Report, occurred at the same time Japan was contemplating 
ratification of the Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty and learned of the Nixon Doctrine.  
The 68/70 Internal Report, a two–part study, studied the technical means, economic cost, 
and the political and diplomatic cost–benefit analysis of an indigenous nuclear weapons 
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program.
193
  The 68/70 Internal Report concluded that nuclearization was only advisable 
if nuclear weapons could ensure Japan’s security.  By the late 1960s, the Japanese 
population had become more antimilitaristic and uninformed of strategic foreign policy.  
These factors affected the experts' conclusion.  When Prime Minister Satō commissioned 
the report, Japan was reaping the rewards of the Yoshida Doctrine.  Satō’s true nuclear 
stance was questionable.  In 1964, he addressed the Diet and said, “If the other fellow has 
nuclear weapons, it is only common sense to have them oneself.  The Japanese public is 
not ready for this, but would have to be educated…nuclear weapons are less costly than is 
generally assumed, and the Japanese scientific and industrial level is fully up to 
producing them.”194  Then in 1967, Satō introduced the three non–nuclear principles, 
which the Diet later adopted in 1971.  The Diet adopted the principles as national policy, 
not law.  Satō described the principles as “nonsense” to US Ambassador Alexis Johnson 
during a 1969 meeting.
195
 
The authors of the report concluded a weapons program would overburden the 
technological and economic capabilities of Japan.  The report also determined the 
diplomatic and strategic costs would reverse everything Japan had achieved under the 
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Yoshida Doctrine.  Japan should continue to rely on its soft power projection of 
economics and avoid any perception of moving away from pacifism.
196
  In 1968, the 
United States had a huge military presence in East and South East Asia supporting the 
Vietnam War.  Japan was comfortable with fully relying on the United States as the 
defender of Japan.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan stated, “For the time being 
we will maintain the policy of not possessing nuclear weapons.” “Keep the economic and 
technical potential for the production of nuclear weapons, while seeing to it that Japan 
will not be interfered with in this regard.”197  “Technological deterrence” is Japan’s 
alternative to crossing the nuclear threshold.  This “technological deterrence” is an 
uncomfortable variable in the calculus of any potential adversary of Japan. 
In 1981, Japan revisited the nuclear option when it conducted a second study.  
This study focused on the technical capability of a nuclear weapons program and less on 
nuclear policy.  Though the study concluded a nuclear weapons program would overly 
tax the industrial and technological means of Japan, a physics expert involved with the 
study stated, “Nuclear weapons could easily be made and at a low cost.”198  If Japan 
would have pursued nuclear weapons at this time, the weapons would have been small 
and crude and Japan would have required assistance with the ancillary support systems.   
Japan would not need a sophisticated program by today’s standard; the Manhattan Project 
lacked the technical advances of today.  “Little Boy”, the resulting bomb, was not as 
efficient as it was designed to be; nevertheless, it was effective enough to cause the 
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Japanese to consider surrendering.  This study bolstered the Japanese leadership’s drive 
to develop and maintain the technical capability to develop a weapons program.  Former 
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone is one of the most outspoken advocates of a Japanese 
nuclear weapons program.  Nakasone commissioned the 1970 internal report when he 
was the Director of the Japanese Defense Agency.
199
  When Nakasone became prime 
minister he also benefited from the 1981 Report, which was produced a year before he 
became prime minister. Nakasone advocated for “small–sized nuclear weapons” used in a 
defensive manner and during emergencies.
200
  “Defensive nuclear weapons” is how Japan 
has referred to any potential nuclear weapon arsenal.  Despite the report’s negative 
conclusion, the report has indirectly helped to reinforce Japan’s decision to maintain a 
latent capability by increasing the nation’s civilian nuclear program. 
The third known study occurred in 1995; this report focused more on the policy 
aspect of a Japanese nuclear weapons program.  This study followed the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and just after the Cold War ended.  With the Soviet Union collapsed, 
the world approached an era of multi–polarism.  Closer to Japan, North Korea had 
threatened to leave the NPT in 1993.  Japan approached these major changes in 
geopolitics by studying the nuclear option.  In 1995, when Japan secretly published this 
study, there were five recognized nuclear weapon states, and at least seven additional 
confirmed or suspected states.  Two of the suspected countries that had started a program 
but abandoned their pursuit included Taiwan and South Korea, neighbors of Japan. 
These global changes caused Japan to reevaluate the nuclear option for a third time. 
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Even though the 1995 study recommended that Japan maintain its non–nuclear 
policy, the study did provide some positive reasons Japan should pursue a nuclear 
weapons program.  The study highlights that nuclear weapons have two purposes:  deter 
and destroy.
201
 This alluded to the fact that Japan’s Self–Defense Forces may be capable 
of destruction on a limited scale, the defense forces have no capability to deter any 
Japan’s potential adversaries.  With the questionable role of the US in the post–Cold War 
period, Japan indicated it was not confident in the United States’ security commitment.  
The 1995 Report specifically states, “At present, it is not clear whether we [Japan] could 
rely on the same extended deterrence as during the Cold War period from the United 
States.”202  The report addressed the fact that during the Cold War tactical nuclear 
weapons could “compensate” for an inferior conventional force facing a nuclear power.  
While addressing tactical nuclear weapons, the experts foreshadowed current events 
between China and Japan in dealing with the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands.  This issue is 
occurring currently; and Shintaro Ishihara, leader of Nippon Ishin No Kai (Japan 
Restoration Party) stated, “Without a strong military deterrence, Japan has no diplomatic 
say.”203  In addition to Ishihara’s comments in the Yomiuri article, Osaka’s Mayor Toru 
Hashimoto indicated the non–nuclear principles need reviewing.  Without nuclear 
weapons and an inferior military force, Japan cannot deter Chinese encroachment on 
Japanese sovereign territory.  This becomes more complicated when the United States, 
Japan’s security umbrella, has strong economic ties with China, which controls a large 
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portion of United States’ debt.  Additionally the report addressed the issues with the NPT, 
many previously been addressed earlier in this thesis.  The authors were unambiguous in 
their dissatisfaction in the progress of the NPT: “It is clear that the existing international 
measures to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons have not by any measure been very 
successful.”204  The Japanese Defense Agency displayed it displeasure with the United 
States security commitment stating, “However much Japan increases the amount of 
money provided through HNS [Host Nation Support], it cannot alleviate the unilateral 
nature, which is the essence of the treaty [Mutual Security Treaty].” 
While there are counter opinions on nuclear proliferation in Japan, there are views 
that proliferation could equal more security for Japan.  The 1995 Report examined two 
cases, “having the deterrent of mutual destruction as counter value (city) force” and “as a 
measure to compensate for inferiority in conventional weapons.”205  The latter assumed 
to address the rising Chinese threat.  The former case articulated that proliferation has 
provided Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea some level of state or regime security.  
Additionally it alluded to an additional fact; Japan has learned that the global community 
will learn to live with or deal with a new nuclear weapon state as the community has 
generally accepted Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.
206
  This leads to the question: 
if nuclear weapons have worked for these four and the world essentially accepted these 
nuclear weapons programs, why not Japan. In the early 2000s Liberal Democratic Party 
                                                 
204
 Japan Defense Agency, “Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” 
205
 Ibid. 
206
 Barnaby, Frank, and Shaun Burnie. Thinking the Unthinkable: Japanese Nuclear Power and 
Proliferation in East Asia. Working paper. Thinking the Unthinkable: Japanese Nuclear Power and 
Proliferation in East Asia. Oxford Research Group and Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, August 1, 
2005, 11, accessed October 1, 2015, 
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/japanreport.pdf. 
 82 
policy chief, Shōichi Nakagawa stated, “[Nuclear weapons will] lower or eliminate [the] 
possibility of attack or give Japan an option to strike back.”207 
All three reports reached similar conclusions: Japan had the means to pursue a 
weapons program, but should remain non–nuclear.  Nevertheless, Japanese politicians 
continued to advocate indirectly for a hedging strategy.  Japan should retain a credible 
capability to produce a nuclear weapon.  Nuclear hedging is not a direct national security 
strategy for Japan; it uses the latent capability indirectly.  Japan does not hide its base 
nuclear capabilities, thus leaving something to chance when contemplated by a potential 
adversary.  Various Japanese Prime Ministers from Prime Minister Kishi to Prime 
Minister Abe have declared that the Japanese Constitution does not limit Japan’s ability 
to develop nuclear weapons.
208
 
 
The Physical Means to Go Nuclear 
Japan is the only non–nuclear weapons state and signatory of the NPT with an 
advanced nuclear fuel cycle.
209
  Japan’s has the capability to enrich uranium and 
reprocess plutonium, both to weapons grade.  Maintaining a virtual nuclear weapons 
program provides Japan with a degree of leverage.  As the Yomiuri newspaper stated, 
“this [use of plutonium] also functions diplomatically as a potential nuclear deterrent.”210  
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Japan has the material and means to produce a nuclear device and has been building this 
capability for almost forty years. Estimates of the time Japan would need from six 
months–to–one year to assemble a crude nuclear device range, three–to–five years for a 
sophisticated nuclear warhead.
211
  Since the 1970s, Japan has advanced its civilian 
nuclear program, developed ancillary systems for a weapons program, and revised old 
restrictive policies; giving Japan the ability to pursue nuclear weapons when desired. 
Since 1954, Japan has had a civilian nuclear research program.  After the 1970 
Mid–East Oil Crisis, Japan began to invest more heavily in its civilian nuclear power 
program in order to decrease Japan’s dependency on foreign energy sources.  Since then 
Japan has become the world’s leader in nuclear research and development.212  Japan has 
43 civilian nuclear power plants of various operational types and two under construction 
post–Fukushima.213  Japan also has over 30 commercial and research nuclear facilities.  
These plants have provided Japan with more than enough fissile material, the most 
essential and often most difficult to obtain piece of a nuclear weapons program, fissile 
material. 
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The first challenge to Japan’s fuel cycle is that there are no naturally occurring 
uranium deposits in Japan.  Since Japan owns ten percent of the world’s 502 metric tons 
of plutonium and is developing an increased capability to reprocess, uranium has become 
increasingly critical to ensuring Japan’s closed fuel cycle.  Japan’s uranium fuel cycle 
consumes over 7,000 tons of uranium annually, thirteen percent of the world’s 
demand.
214
 In the last ten years, Japan has begun to invest in uranium mining ventures 
and corporations to overcome this challenge.  Japan has focused on three primary 
countries, Canada, Australia, and Kazakhstan.  In 2007, Marubeni and Tepeo of Japan 
purchased 40 percent of the Kazak mine Kharasan, roughly 2,000 tons of uranium a 
year.
215
  In 2008, a joint Japanese and Australian venture between Mitsui and Uranium 
One resulted in Japanese owning 49 percent of the project.  One year later, three 
companies from Japan purchased twenty percent of the Honeymoon Mine, giving Japan 
controlling interest of the mining project with 59 percent ownership.
216
  With resources 
secured, Japan has been able to secure the future of its advanced nuclear fuel cycle. 
In an effort to relieve Japan of its dependency on foreign energy sources, Japan is 
developing a closed fuel cycle, relying on plutonium reprocessing.  A plutonium fuel 
cycle reprocesses plutonium up to 60–70 percent fissionable plutonium–239 and 
plutonium–241; weapons grade plutonium is reprocessed to 90 percent.  Japan has 
developed an advanced nuclear power program; and continues to develop facilities that 
are more advanced.  The reprocessing plant at Rokkasho, scheduled to come online in 
2016, will be the first fast breeder reprocessing plant outside an NPT declared nuclear–
weapons state.  Once complete, the Rokkasho reprocessing plant will reprocess 
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plutonium at a rate of four to eight tons of fissile plutonium annually, more than Japan 
can consume.
217
  Four to eight tons per year will add to Japan’s 10.8 tons of domestically 
stored plutonium, increasing Japan’s 44.3 metric tons of separated plutonium.218  In the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative’s 2014 Materials Security Index, Japan ranks thirteenth (out of 
25) overall security index, tied for 22nd with India and Pakistan for quantities and 
sites.
219
  Japan’s stockpile represents ten percent of the world’s plutonium stocks; 
exceeded the US’s 38 declared tons of plutonium; and is enough plutonium to produce 
over 5,000 nuclear weapons.  
Japan also has an advanced uranium enrichment capability, though with the large 
plutonium stockpile this capability is almost insignificant.  However, Japan initiated an 
enrichment plant at Rokkasho in 1997, with indigenous technology, later upgraded with 
Russian centrifuge technology.
220
  Uranium enrichment not only assists with completing 
Japan’s closed fuel cycle, it also provides Japan with a second path to nuclear weapons.   
These two fuel cycles give Japan clear and credible pathways to nuclear weapons.  
Japan’s weapons capability has always maintained a level of ambiguity.  When the 
Japanese governmental makes the decision to pursue a weapons program, Japan’s has an 
incredible head start in producing a nuclear device.  Until Japan makes that decision, 
Japan’s latent nuclear capability looms large among Japan’s regional neighbors. 
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Japanese Technical and Delivery Means 
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other individual members of the 
Government of Japan have indicated Japan will maintain a capability to pursue nuclear 
weapons when and if it chooses.  During the 1960s, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
document established Japan’s nuclear hedge policy, “Keep the economic and technical 
potential for the production of nuclear weapons, while seeing to it that Japan will not be 
interfered with in this regard.”221 Forty–six years later, Japan maintains the technological 
means not only to develop a weapon but also the means to deliver it. 
Japan has the technological means to develop a weapons program and a delivery 
method.  Japan has a large number of university graduates but relies heavily on Japanese 
business firms for innovation in research and development.  Japan spent 2.7 percent of 
2012’s GDP on innovation.222  This is partly because of the separation Japan maintains 
between the defense agency and civilian academia.  Policies like the Japanese Atomic 
Energy Law— restrictions against defense applications of atomic energy—create a 
divide, wherein the Ministry of Defense cannot be directly included in atomic 
innovations.  This divide is closing with amendments of various policies including the 
Atomic Energy Law.  Previously restricted applications can now support national security 
concerns, opening an avenue for military cooperation. 
In 2004, The United Nations conducted the dismantlement of Libya’s enrichment 
program.  While the United Nations Team was inspecting and inventorying Libya’s 
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equipment, the team discovered the Japanese were assisting Libya since 1984.
223
  The 
dismantlement team also found among the enrichment equipment precision instruments 
made in Japan.  The instruments found in Libya “measure size and three–dimensional 
shapes. These [instruments] are used for high–precision machinery parts”, like 
centrifuges.
224
  Centrifuges for enriching uranium require an extraordinary degree of 
precision.  These tools are an example of Japan’s computer and technical capabilities.  If 
Japan has the domestic capability to produce highly precision tools, developing the 
ancillary support equipment and systems for a nuclear weapons program would is not 
insurmountable. 
Japan also has engaged in the supercomputer race.  Supercomputers have the 
capability to process complex scientific equations or problems that would take humans 
weeks to work though.  Since 1992, the last year the United States tested a nuclear 
weapon, supercomputers “test” or simulate model detonations of the United States’ 
nuclear weapons.  The world’s current top–ten supercomputers have an operating 
capacity measured in teraflops or trillion floating–point operations per second.225 Many 
developed countries (including the US, China, and Japan) in the world are racing to be 
the first country to achieve exaflop computing capacity. An exaflop is one quintillion 
(1,000,000,000,000,000,000) calculations per second.  As of 2015, Japan’s largest 
supercomputer currently ranks fourth in the world, behind one Chinese supercomputer 
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and two US supercomputers, respectively.
226
  Japan has given the Fujitsu Corporation the 
mandate for developing a supercomputer to regain the “top–spot” in supercomputer 
technology, one exaflop is the target capability.
227
  Japan’s new supercomputer or even 
its predecessor easily has the capability to expedite Japan’s nuclear weapons production 
timeline.  The supercomputers would also provide Japan the ability to leap beyond a 
crude, first, production prototype.  The computer would assist Japanese scientists in 
avoiding the design hurdles United States scientist experienced in the early days of the 
United States’ nuclear weapons program.  Export restrictions on high–speed computer 
processors in the United States and China have forced Japan to develop a domestic 
computer component–manufacturing infrastructure.  These capabilities further highlight 
Japan’s advanced capabilities in science. 
Japan also possesses advanced missile technology within their civilian space 
program that if modified could deliver a nuclear warhead.  Japan has at least two missiles 
(M–5 and H–2) that most literature has determined, if modified, could carry a nuclear 
payload.  The fifteen–year old M–5 similar to the United States’ MX Peacekeeper Missile 
has a 1.8–ton payload capacity and has solid fuel.228  The H–2 has a payload capacity of 
two tons.  However, the drawback to the H–2 is its reliance on liquid fuel.229  
Additionally in 2008, Japan amended the Basic Space Law.  This amendment included a 
clause to include Japan’s national security, which could provide the Ministry of Defense 
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the ability to develop ballistic missile technology.
230
  If the Japanese could modify these 
missiles or combine the two designs into a solid–fueled, three–stage, missile with a 
comparable payload, Japan could deliver a warhead globally. 
Japan was the fourth country to launch a satellite successfully with a solid–fueled, 
three–stage rocket.231 Since 1970, Japan has continued to improve upon its rocket 
technology.  Japan has developed intelligence satellites and successfully launched them.  
In an effort to further advance missile and guidance technology, Japan developed a 
program with the goal of landing a satellite on an asteroid and return it to Earth.  In 2010, 
the Hayabusa satellite successfully launched, landed on the asteroid, and returned to 
Earth.
232
  This test validated Japan’s guidance technology.  On November 24, 2015, 
Japan successfully launched its 28th H2A rocket, rocketing a Canadian satellite into orbit.  
This was the 29th launch of the H2A, an upgraded two–staged rocket capable of reaching 
altitudes between 300 and 36,000 kilometers.
233
  The technology used in these missiles 
and satellites, are essentially the same technology that is required for an intercontinental 
ballistic missile with a targetable reentry vehicle; the US calls this system the Minuteman 
II. 
Japan also has three other delivery methods it could pursue.  First, it could deliver 
nuclear weapons by airplanes like traditional bombs.  Japan would have to develop 
specific arming, fusing and firing systems within the bomb to ensure the weapon 
detonated at the desired time and altitude.  The Japanese is replacing the Japanese Air 
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Self–Defense Forces’ aging fighter jets with the F–35, a dual–capable aircraft of the 
United States and NATO.  Besides being a dual–capable aircraft, the F–35 has stealth 
capabilities.  Under Prime Minister Koizumi, Japan’s defense won Diet approval to 
upgrade Japan’s long–range strike capability including, strike aircraft, air fuel tankers, 
missile defense, and AEGIS class cruisers. This could provide Japan with an initial 
delivery system until it could develop additional delivery methods. 
Second, Japan could pursue cruise missile technology.  In the early 1990s, the 
United Stated decided to remove nuclear tipped cruise missiles (TLAM/N) from naval 
ships.  Japan viewed this weapon system as its first–line weapon under the US Nuclear 
Umbrella.
234
  Recently Japan has demonstrated interest in developing cruise missile 
technology.
235
  A TLAM/N–like missile would provide Japan an intermediate delivery 
system until the country could develop a nuclear dyad or triad. 
Third, Japan could pursue a “sea–leg” of a future system for delivering nuclear 
weapons.  In the 2016 Japanese Defense Budget, the Ministry of Defense has requested 
funding for amphibious and surface ships.  This is an indication that Japan is beginning to 
develop its naval power, in opposition to regional threats.  The next logical step to 
develop Japan’s naval power further is to develop its submarine capabilities.  Japan 
would not have to build its own submarines.  Japan could easily purchase a French 
nuclear submarine for $13 billion, well within Japan’s economic means.236  By the time 
Japan either purchased or built a nuclear submarine, the world would already know Japan 
has nuclear weapons. 
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Nuclear Material Diversion 
Japan has one of the world’s largest and most advanced civilian nuclear power 
programs; this increases its ability to divert nuclear material in order to develop a nuclear 
weapon.  This idea or theory is not entirely hypothetical.  Between 2012 and 2013, Japan 
failed to report 640 kilograms of plutonium, enough to produce about 80 nuclear 
weapons.
237
  Japan has over 36,000 kilograms of plutonium.  640 kilograms is only 1.7 
percent of the total, and eight kilograms—enough to produce a single warhead—is only 
0.00022 percent of Japan’s total plutonium stockpile.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
experts estimate it will take between 180 days to three years to produce an advanced 
nuclear weapon.  As the Japanese investigated this incident, investigators determined the 
lack of accountability resulted from a “clerical mistake”.238  Despite the policies and 
processes highlighted by the Japan Atomic Energy Commission to the Royal Society 
Workshop in 2010, 80 weapons worth of nuclear material evaded IAEA scrutiny for over 
two years.
239
 
When the Japanese Government determines its national security is existentially 
threatened, Japan’s latent nuclear weapons program could transform in a short time.  
Japan maintains a technological capability to develop a nuclear weapons program 
quickly.  This program would initially be crude; however, it would only take a couple of 
years to develop an advanced nuclear weapons program. 
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AGAINST ALL EXPECTATIONS 
 
After suffering from the world’s only two hostile atomic detonations, the long–
standing lay expectation has been that Japan will never develop an indigenous nuclear 
weapons program.  However, when a nation’s security is threatened, its survival can force 
shifts in established policies.  Japanese policies or laws combined with international 
norms, the United States alliance, and globalization make up the broad groups of 
arguments against Japan developing a nuclear weapon.  Most experts point to Japan’s 
own policies and laws in combination with international norms are the reasons Japan will 
remain non–nuclear.   From the Japanese Constitution to established policies, Japan 
appears steadfast in its anti–nuclear weapons stance.  However, governments pass and 
repeal laws and change their constitutions. 
 
Reinterpreting Japanese Law 
Japan’s first law concerning nuclear was the Atomic Energy Basic Law (1955).  
The basic policy of this law is defined as: 
Article 2 (Basic Policy), “The research, development and utilization of nuclear 
energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, shall aim at ensuring safety, and 
shall be performed independently under democratic administration, and the results 
obtained shall be made public so as to actively contribute to international 
cooperation.”240 
 
However, in June 2012, the Diet enacted the Nuclear Regulation Authority, which also 
changed the wording of the 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law.  The 2012 act added, “to 
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contribute to national security of this country [Japan]” to Article 2 (Basic Policy).241  The 
Japanese Government further explained this addition focuses on protecting “nuclear 
material and facilities”, but still raises the possibility and provides the avenue for the 
government to initiate a clandestine program.
242
 
The change to the 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law is not the only major shift in 
Japan’s laws addressing national security.  In September 2015, the Diet passed two laws 
addressing national security issues.  One law amended ten existing security laws relating 
to restrictions on the Self–Defense Force (Japan’s military), including revised 
interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution—restriction on collective self–
defense.  The second law, a permanent law, allows for the deployment of the Self–
Defense Force to provide logistic support to United Nations military operations.  Passing 
a law to reinterpret the Constitution is more feasible than seeking a constitutional 
amendment.  Additional laws of this nature could make Article 9 toothless, opening the 
door further to additional remilitarization.  This method of skirting constitutional change 
by the Abe Government will lead, over time, to the general acceptance of a “new Japan”, 
one with more state power. 
The Japanese Constitution also provides a legal bases forcing Japan to observe all 
treaties it is a signatory.  Article 98 of the Japanese Constitution (Appendix A) states, 
“This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial 
rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, 
shall have legal force or validity.  The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws 
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of nations shall be faithfully observed.”243  This means that the Constitution is the law of 
Japan; however, Japan must also fulfill all of its treaty obligations too.  As such, the NPT 
becomes a critical document for Japan to observe.  The NPT is the “legal document” that 
prevents Japan from pursuing a nuclear weapons program.  On the other hand, this same 
document is the basis for all signatories to also remain non–nuclear and disarm.  Article 
VI of the NPT states, “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations 
in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an 
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control.”244  Since becoming a party 
to the treaty in 1976, Japan has been one of the treaty’s staunchest supporters.  
Nevertheless, in the last couple of decades, Japan has witnessed the failure of multiple 
NPT Review Conferences and the continuous failure of Article VI.
245
  North Korea has 
also shaken Japan’s confidence in the NPT.  North Korea was a signatory to the NPT 
then in 1994, invoked Article X, the withdraw article.  Initially on the 89th day, North 
Korea “suspended” its notice of intent to withdraw, only to abruptly withdraw in 2003.  
North Korea is the recipient of economically punishing unilateral and multilateral 
sanctions over its proliferation policies.  To date, North Korea remains a threating nuclear 
weapon state, a nation with increased regional influence, and a model for other nations 
like Iran who wish to challenge the NPT and other international norms.  The Kim Family 
also remains firmly in control of the country.  India, Pakistan, and Israel, though not NPT 
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signatories, are examples of states that have challenged the international norm and 
remained influential in their region. 
Throughout the United Nations Charter, there are repeated references to self–
determination and self–defense.  The Government of Japan, obligated by Article 98 of its 
Constitution, is now using treaties Japan is party to, to reinterpret the Japanese 
Constitution.  The key treaty to this reinterpretation is, Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter, which provides nations with the ability to exercise self–defense and collective 
self–defense.  This article provides the government with a solid argument for expanding 
the capabilities of the Japanese Self–Defense Force.  This article could also support 
previous Japanese Prime Ministers’ and senior Japanese Government Officials’ calls for 
“defensive nuclear weapons.”  Additionally, if the United Nations would protest to a 
Japanese effort to nuclearize, Japan could simple invoke its NPT right of withdrawal.  
Nowhere in the NPT are there punitive measures for non–signatories or signatories who 
withdraw and develop nuclear weapons.  Japan—if it was determined that extraordinary 
events threating Japan’s national sovereignty existed—could withdraw from the treaty 
and develop nuclear weapons.  The main difference between Japan and North Korea 
would be, Japan should never declare for whom the nuclear weapons are deterring, or 
threaten any country with their use.  This way, though decoupling from the NPT, Japan 
would remain within the intent of the Charter of the United Nations.
246
  Tadae Takubo, a 
professor of policy at Kyorin University, stated, “For a nation to entirely forsake nuclear 
weapons is like taking part in a boxing match and promising not to throw hooks.”247 
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The Strong Hold of Globalization 
As compared to the Shogunate period, Japan is a wide–opened society.  Just as the 
industrial revolution took hold of Japan during the Meiji Period, globalization has 
controlled Japan during the late twentieth century and into the twenty–first century.  
Japan faces more foreign policy and global issues than it ever did in its past.  Japan’s 
economic dominance in the region and in the world has guided its foreign policy.  Now 
globalization and regional balance is beginning to guide more than economic policy.  If 
Japan continues with remilitarization to the point of developing nuclear weapons, does 
Japan have to face geopolitical isolation? 
Proliferation trends indicate that Japan may be too valuable of an ally and 
economic power for the international community to attempt to isolate it in the way it has 
isolated North Korea.  North Korea was threating South Korea, Japan, and the United 
States long before it withdrew from the NPT or detonated the first North Korean nuclear 
device.  Despite territorial disputes with China, Russia, and South Korea, Japan has made 
no threats nor taken threating actions toward any of these countries.  In fact, Japan has 
decent diplomatic relations with Russia, with who Japan is still formally at war.  
Nuclearization for Japan does not have to equal geopolitical isolation. 
Examples of nuclearization without isolation like India and Pakistan maybe the 
model.  When these two countries detonated their nuclear weapons, the repercussions 
were light and short.  Both of these countries have proven to be invaluable in United 
States’ foreign policy.  Twice Pakistan exemplified its critical geopolitical position.  
First, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan—Pakistan was well on path to a nuclear 
weapon—Pakistan was a critical partner and staging base for the United States.  Then, 
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post–September 11, 2001, Pakistan, which had already detonated six weapons, again 
proved a pivotal ally in moving United States troops and equipment into Afghanistan.  
India has proven to be a critical and emerging ally for the United States as a buffer 
between Europe and China, both territorially and economically.  India is the world’s 
largest democracy.  India is also an emerging economic power.  Both India and 
Pakistan’s economies were largely unaffected by any sanctions against nuclearization 
(Figure 9).  Additionally, Israel—who most experts believe has nuclear weapons—has 
never received sanctions or been investigated.  Israel is and has always been a critical ally 
in the Middle East.  The United States has increasing interests in India and Pakistan; and 
the United States is willing to “look the other way” when concerning Pakistan’s and 
India’s weapons and the possibility that Israel possesses nuclear weapons.  Japan has a 
much larger global economic dominance than both India and Pakistan combined and is as 
vitally important as Israel.  Various formerly classified United States documents indicate 
the willingness of the United States to allow Japan to remilitarize; these documents date 
back to 1953.
248
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Figure 9:  GDP percent Growth of Pakistan and India in the Years after their first Nuclear 
Detonations.  Denotes each country’s first nuclear test.  
 
 
impacts.  Japan has the world’s third largest economy, behind the United States and 
China.  In 2013, Japan ranked fourth in global merchandise trade, approximately $1.54 
billion.
249
  According to the World Shipping Council, Japan exported and imported over 
11.8 million twenty–foot equivalent units (a standardized cargo container unit of 
measure).
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  Within the East Asian and Pacific Region—as defined by the United States 
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Department of State—Japan is in the top five import or export partners of twenty of the 
thirty East Asian and Pacific Region countries.
251
  Additionally, as of February of 2015, 
Japan held $1.224 trillion of United States—a permanent member of United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC)—securities.  Complicating matters even more, China—another 
permanent member of the UNSC—held $1.223 trillion of United States securities.  Japan 
has significant leverage with a veto wielding Security Council member.
252
  However, 
China may be able to influence two Security Council votes. 
Should Japan pursue nuclear weapons and the international community decided to 
impose sanctions, as it did with Iran and North Korea, the effects would be globally 
crippling.  With the progression of globalization, international sanctions on Japan would 
have the potential to cripple the global economy.  At the very least, sanctions would have 
a devastating impact on the Asian economy, which would then affect the global 
economy. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, “There are known knowns.  
There are things we know that we know.  There are known unknowns.  That is to say, 
there are things that we know we don’t know.  But there are also unknown unknowns.  
There are things we do not know we don’t know.”253  There are an infinite number of 
variables and arguments for and against Japan’s nuclearlization.  The decision will 
ultimately be Japan’s to make.  If Japan decides to proceed, the world will only know 
when Japan decides to disclose it.  When the United States embarked on the Manhattan 
Project, the project was very controlled.  Even when Harry S. Truman succeeded Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Truman required briefing on the project and its status because he did not 
know of the program.   
In the new globalized world, Japan can no longer afford to rely solely on its 
economy and traditional peaceful tea ceremony image.  It is time for Japan to reintroduce 
a tempered version of its traditional Bushidō  (way of the warrior) Code.  Of all countries, 
Japan should be the most trusted with nuclear weapons, because Japan has suffered from 
the undesired receipt of these weapons and resulting destruction.  Japan above anyone 
else would contemplate and agonize most about the use of these weapons. 
Japan is the only nation to have suffered hostile nuclear detonations.  Despite the 
devastation Japan suffered during World War II, it has rebuilt and claimed a key position 
on the global political stage.  However, events in the Northeast Asian region, its 
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relationship with the United States, and the failure of international norms may force 
Japan to deviate from its long–standing antinuclear stance.  Precipitated by shifts in 
relations with the United States, United States security commitment concerns, regional 
instability, and a declining nuclear proliferation regime, Japan may be nearing the end of 
its slow crossing of  the nuclear threshold. 
The relationship with the United States has waxed and waned over the last 
seventy years.  Each time the relationship has strained, Japan has refocused resources to 
its military, and periodically contemplated the nuclear option.  Each time Japan has 
explored the nuclear option, results persuaded the government to maintain their non–
nuclear stance.  Yet, the current situation Japan finds itself in, is different from previous 
times.  Japan’s strongest ally, the United States, is in a period of retrenchment.  Though, 
the United States says it is pivoting toward Asia, the pivot has been slow, if happening at 
all.  The biggest focus has been economic versus any holistic package of state power.  
The situation in the Middle East has also continued to pull the United States from the 
proposed pivot.  The political agendas of the United States and Japan seem to be 
diverging pushing the countries a little further apart.  The two of the world’s strongest 
allies appear to have fewer national security objectives and interests in common than in 
their past. 
Since the signing of the treaty ending World War II, Japan has depended on the 
United States for security.  The ensuing security treaties have included protection under 
the United States’ nuclear umbrella.  During the Cold War, the United States’ nuclear 
enterprise was second to none.  With the Soviet threat, United States nuclear weapons 
had a clear purpose and the need was dire.  Nevertheless, after the Cold War ended, 
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nuclear weapons fell from view—pushed to the back burner as it were, and the enterprise 
began to decay.  Questions surrounding the credibility of the nuclear umbrella forced the 
United States to allow Japanese officials to tour US nuclear facilities in May 2012, to 
reassure Japan.
254
  Nevertheless, reductions in the arsenal, conflicting policies, and cuts in 
funding keep the credibility question at the forefront of the Japanese Government. 
Japan is located in an increasingly instable neighborhood.  Japan faces three 
primary threats:  North Korea, China, and Russia.  These three countries reinforce their 
threats with nuclear weapons.  North Korea continues to challenge not only its regional 
neighbors but also the international community, with impunity.  The nuclear weapons 
program of North Korea is now more–or–less accepted as a norm in the international 
community.  China continues to increase its economic and military might.  Apart from a 
dramatic shift in policy either by the United States or by China, experts project China to 
surpass the United States’ conventional military power in the next decade.  China is 
arguably the most aggressive country in  Northeast Asia.  China is making claims in the 
East and South China Seas.  Again, these aggressive actions, like North Korea, seem to 
go unchallenged or unpunished.  The neither international community nor regional 
neighbors can seriously challenge China because it has gained too much influence in the 
international community and region. 
Russia is the wildcard.  Russia appears to be reestablishing the old USSR, just 
under a different name and system.  Russia is technically still at war with Japan.  The 
main disagreement is over claims to the Kuril Islands, just north of Japan.  Russia has 
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occupied the islands since World War II despite Japan’s claim to the islands.  Since 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Eastern Ukraine, Russia has lost its oil 
and gas revenue from Europe.  Russia, with a crippled economy, has established energy 
trade deals with energy–starved China.  Russia not only sells oil and gas to China, but 
Russia is also selling premium military hardware to China.  Russia has also developed 
petroleum deals with North Korea.  In the last decade, Japan has responded to both 
Russian and Chinese encroachments into Japanese air and maritime territories.  If these 
countries continue with their perceived aggression, Japan may find herself in a “Gray 
War” with one or more of these nuclear–armed countries.  This precipitates more the 
possibility that Japan may pursue a nuclear weapons program, in order to deter 
effectively these countries. 
Japan has been an ardent supporter of the Nuclear Proliferation Regime.  
However, Japan has also witnessed the fracturing of this regime.  With countries either 
withdrawing or not participating without any repercussions, Japan may decide the regime 
is not worth the effort and resources.  Japan may take the lessons learned from the limited 
actions or inactions against these countries as a signal that Japan will not suffer any 
consequences for a decision to pursue a nuclear weapons program.  As part of the NPT, 
those countries that are signatories, agreed to disarm; however, over forty years after the 
creation of this treaty, there are still five nuclear–armed countries, and total disarmament 
is a distant realization.  Why, indeed, should Japan, a nuclear “have–not” state, continue 
to be vulnerable and not rearm and develop a nuclear weapons program? 
There is no question Japan has the means to develop an indigenous program.  
Most countries in the region believe Japan has a bomb in the basement.  Even in the 
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1960s, the Government of Japan declared the country would retain the capability to 
develop a nuclear weapons program, when and if it so decided.  Japan has over forty–
three nuclear facilities.  640 kilograms of nuclear material has already been unaccounted 
for, for over two years: by some experts’ opinion, more than enough time for Japan to 
assemble a crude device.  All Japan would need is a crude weapon at first, enough to 
leave something to chance.  Japan is also taking steps toward increasing its conventional 
military.  In 2015, the Government of Japan passed multiple laws that increase the 
capabilities and abilities of the Japanese Self–Defense Force.  Several of these laws 
aimed to reinterpret Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.  This reinterpretation will 
provide the Japanese Government with increased leverage and ability to pursue a nuclear 
weapons program when it chooses. 
Japan’s non–nuclear stance depends on four factors: the alliance with the United 
States, the United States’ nuclear deterrence, regional stability, and the nuclear 
proliferation regime.  Japan is experiencing an unsettling trend in these factors.  Add to 
this growing nationalism among the younger generation who are reaching the age to 
become politicians, and a significant shift in Japanese policy may be on the horizon.  This 
generation of new politicians is forty–plus–years removed from the memories of World 
War II.  From Prime Minister Kishi to Prime Minister Abe, most prime ministers have 
indicated that Article 9 of the Constitution does not limit Japan’s ability to develop 
nuclear weapons.  For Japan, a nuclear weapon would be a “Japanese Self–Defense 
Deterrent” not dissimilar to the Japanese Self–Defense Force, both, by direct 
interpretation of the Constitution are illegal.  However reinterpretation of the Constitution 
and a slow build–up in the Self–Defense Force over time, have resulted in acceptance of 
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broader mission requirements of the Japanese Self–Defense Forces.  The Japanese 
Government has played this semantic game since 1950.  A nation, with Japan’s key 
global influence but great dependency on the United States for national security—in 
today’s international community—makes Japan an abnormal country.  In a multipolar 
world, where the United States is losing the dominance it once had after the Cold War, 
Japan’s government focus is on moving the country toward a more “normal” status. 
When the reclining dragon rises to defend Japan, the dragon will have a plutonium pit in 
his claws. 
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THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN 
                                                                                      Promulgated on November 3, 1946 
                                                                                      Came into effect on May 3, 1947 
 
We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the 
National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of 
peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, 
and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the 
action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do 
firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the 
authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the 
representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is 
a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and 
revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith.  
 
We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the 
high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our 
security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace–loving peoples of the 
world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the 
preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and 
intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have 
the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.  
 
We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political 
morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who 
would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other 
nations.  
 
We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high 
ideals and purposes with all our resources.  
 
CHAPTER I 
THE EMPEROR 
 
Article 1.  The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the People, 
deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.  
 
Article 2.  The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and succeeded to in accordance with the 
Imperial House Law passed by the Diet.  
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Article 3.  The advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be required for all acts of the 
Emperor in matters of state, and the Cabinet shall be responsible therefor.  
Article 4.  The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are provided 
for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government. 
The Emperor may delegate the performance of his acts in matters of state as may be 
provided by law.  
 
Article 5.  When, in accordance with the Imperial House Law, a Regency is established, 
the Regent shall perform his acts in matters of state in the Emperor's name. In this case, 
paragraph one of the preceding article will be applicable.  
 
Article 6.  The Emperor shall appoint the Prime Minister as designated by the Diet.  The 
Emperor shall appoint the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court as designated by the 
Cabinet.  
 
Article 7.  The Emperor, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, shall perform the 
following acts in matters of state on behalf of the people:  
Promulgation of amendments of the constitution, laws, cabinet orders and treaties. 
 Convocation of the Diet. 
 Dissolution of the House of Representatives. 
 Proclamation of general election of members of the Diet. 
 Attestation of the appointment and dismissal of Ministers of State and other officials as 
provided for by law, and of full powers and credentials of Ambassadors and Ministers. 
 Attestation of general and special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and 
restoration of rights. 
 Awarding of honors. 
 Attestation of instruments of ratification and other diplomatic documents as provided for 
by law. 
 Receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers. 
 Performance of ceremonial functions. 
 
Article 8.  No property can be given to, or received by, the Imperial House, nor can any 
gifts be made therefrom, without the authorization of the Diet.  
 
CHAPTER II 
RENUNCIATION OF WAR 
 
Article 9.  Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or 
use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of 
the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will 
never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.  
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CHAPTER III 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PEOPLE 
 
Article 10.  The conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined 
by law.  
 
Article 11.  The people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental 
human rights. These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this 
Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations as eternal 
and inviolate rights.  
 
Article 12.  The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall 
be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse 
of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the 
public welfare.  
 
Article 13.  All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public 
welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.  
 
Article 14.  All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination 
in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or 
family origin. 
Peers and peerage shall not be recognized.  
No privilege shall accompany any award of honor, decoration or any distinction, nor shall 
any such award be valid beyond the lifetime of the individual who now holds or hereafter 
may receive it. 
 
Article 15.  The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to 
dismiss them.  
All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group thereof. 
Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to the election of public officials.  
In all elections, secrecy of the ballot shall not be violated. A voter shall not be 
answerable, publicly or privately, for the choice he has made.  
 
Article 16.   Every person shall have the right of peaceful petition for the redress of 
damage, for the removal of public officials, for the enactment, repeal or amendment of 
laws, ordinances or regulations and for other matters; nor shall any person be in any way 
discriminated against for sponsoring such a petition.  
 
Article 17.   Every person may sue for redress as provided by law from the State or a 
public entity, in case he has suffered damage through illegal act of any public official.  
 
Article 18.   No person shall be held in bondage of any kind. Involuntary servitude, 
except as punishment for crime, is prohibited.  
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Article 19. Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be violated.  
 
Article 20. Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall 
receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority. 
No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or 
practice. 
The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious 
activity.  
 
Article 21. Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other 
forms of expression are guaranteed. 
No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication 
be violated.  
 
Article 22. Every person shall have freedom to choose and change his residence and to 
choose his occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare. 
Freedom of all persons to move to a foreign country and to divest themselves of their 
nationality shall be inviolate.  
 
Article 23. Academic freedom is guaranteed.  
 
Article 24. Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall 
be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a 
basis. 
With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce 
and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be enacted from the 
standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes.  
 
Article 25. All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of 
wholesome and cultured living. 
In all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of 
social welfare and security, and of public health.  
 
Article 26. All people shall have the right to receive an equal education correspondent to 
their ability, as provided by law. 
All people shall be obligated to have all boys and girls under their protection receive 
ordinary education as provided for by law. Such compulsory education shall be free.  
 
Article 27. All people shall have the right and the obligation to work. 
Standards for wages, hours, rest and other working conditions shall be fixed by law. 
Children shall not be exploited.  
 
Article 28. The right of workers to organize and to bargain and act collectively is 
guaranteed.  
 
Article 29. The right to own or to hold property is inviolable. 
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Property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with the public welfare. 
Private property may be taken for public use upon just compensation therefor.  
Article 30. The people shall be liable to taxation as provided by law.  
 
Article 31. No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal 
penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law.  
 
Article 32. No person shall be denied the right of access to the courts.  
 
Article 33. No person shall be apprehended except upon warrant issued by a competent 
judicial officer which specifies the offense with which the person is charged, unless he is 
apprehended, the offense being committed.  
 
Article 34. No person shall be arrested or detained without being at once informed of the 
charges against him or without the immediate privilege of counsel; nor shall he be 
detained without adequate cause; and upon demand of any person such cause must be 
immediately shown in open court in his presence and the presence of his counsel.  
 
Article 35. The right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers and effects against 
entries, searches and seizures shall not be impaired except upon warrant issued for 
adequate cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be 
seized, or except as provided by Article 33. 
Each search or seizure shall be made upon separate warrant issued by a competent 
judicial officer.  
 
Article 36. The infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel punishments are 
absolutely forbidden.  
 
Article 37. In all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial by an impartial tribunal. 
He shall be permitted full opportunity to examine all witnesses, and he shall have the 
right of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses on his behalf at public expense. 
At all times the accused shall have the assistance of competent counsel who shall, if the 
accused is unable to secure the same by his own efforts, be assigned to his use by the 
State.  
 
Article 38.  No person shall be compelled to testify against himself. 
Confession made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after prolonged arrest or 
detention shall not be admitted in evidence. 
No person shall be convicted or punished in cases where the only proof against him is his 
own confession.  
 
Article 39. No person shall be held criminally liable for an act which was lawful at the 
time it was committed, or of which he has been acquitted, nor shall he be placed in 
double jeopardy.  
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Article 40. Any person, in case he is acquitted after he has been arrested or detained, may 
sue the State for redress as provided by law.  
 
CHAPTER IV 
THE DIET 
 
Article 41. The Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole law–
making organ of the State.  
 
Article 42. The Diet shall consist of two Houses, namely the House of Representatives 
and the House of Councillors.  
 
Article 43. Both Houses shall consist of elected members, representative of all the people. 
The number of the members of each House shall be fixed by law.  
 
Article 44. The qualifications of members of both Houses and their electors shall be fixed 
by law. However, there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social 
status, family origin, education, property or income.  
 
Article 45. The term of office of members of the House of Representatives shall be four 
years. However, the term shall be terminated before the full term is up in case the House 
of Representatives is dissolved.  
 
Article 46. The term of office of members of the House of Councillors shall be six years, 
and election for half the members shall take place every three years.  
 
Article 47. Electoral districts, method of voting and other matters pertaining to the 
method of election of members of both Houses shall be fixed by law.  
 
Article 48. No person shall be permitted to be a member of both Houses simultaneously.  
 
Article 49. Members of both Houses shall receive appropriate annual payment from the 
national treasury in accordance with law.  
 
Article 50. Except in cases provided by law, members of both Houses shall be exempt 
from apprehension while the Diet is in session, and any members apprehended before the 
opening of the session shall be freed during the term of the session upon demand of the 
House.  
 
Article 51. Members of both Houses shall not be held liable outside the House for 
speeches, debates or votes cast inside the House.  
 
Article 52. An ordinary session of the Diet shall be convoked once per year.  
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Article 53. The Cabinet may determine to convoke extraordinary sessions of the Diet. 
When a quarter or more of the total members of either House makes the demand, the 
Cabinet must determine on such convocation.  
 
Article 54. When the House of Representatives is dissolved, there must be a general 
election of members of the House of Representatives within forty (40) days from the date 
of dissolution, and the Diet must be convoked within thirty (30) days from the date of the 
election. 
When the House of Representatives is dissolved, the House of Councillors is closed at the 
same time. However, the Cabinet may in time of national emergency convoke the House 
of Councillors in emergency session. 
Measures taken at such session as mentioned in the proviso of the preceding paragraph 
shall be provisional and shall become null and void unless agreed to by the House of 
Representatives within a period of ten (10) days after the opening of the next session of 
the Diet.  
 
Article 55. Each House shall judge disputes related to qualifications of its members. 
However, in order to deny a seat to any member, it is necessary to pass a resolution by a 
majority of two–thirds or more of the members present.  
 
Article 56. Business cannot be transacted in either House unless one–third or more of 
total membership is present. 
All matters shall be decided, in each House, by a majority of those present, except as 
elsewhere provided in the Constitution, and in case of a tie, the presiding officer shall 
decide the issue.  
 
Article 57. Deliberation in each House shall be public. However, a secret meeting may be 
held where a majority of two–thirds or more of those members present passes a resolution 
therefor. 
Each House shall keep a record of proceedings. This record shall be published and given 
general circulation, excepting such parts of proceedings of secret session as may be 
deemed to require secrecy. 
Upon demand of one–fifth or more of the members present, votes of the members on any 
matter shall be recorded in the minutes.  
 
Article 58. Each House shall select its own president and other officials. 
Each House shall establish its rules pertaining to meetings, proceedings and internal 
discipline, and may punish members for disorderly conduct. However, in order to expel a 
member, a majority of two–thirds or more of those members present must pass a 
resolution thereon.  
 
Article 59. A bill becomes a law on passage by both Houses, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution. 
A bill which is passed by the House of Representatives, and upon which the House of 
Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, 
 134 
becomes a law when passed a second time by the House of Representatives by a majority 
of two–thirds or more of the members present. 
The provision of the preceding paragraph does not preclude the House of Representatives 
from calling for the meeting of a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law. 
Failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within sixty (60) days after 
receipt of a bill passed by the House of Representatives, time in recess excepted, may be 
determined by the House of Representatives to constitute a rejection of the said bill by 
the House of Councillors.  
 
Article 60. The budget must first be submitted to the House of Representatives.  
Upon consideration of the budget, when the House of Councillors makes a decision 
different from that of the House of Representatives, and when no agreement can be 
reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, or in the 
case of failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within thirty (30) days, the 
period of recess excluded, after the receipt of the budget passed by the House of 
Representatives, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the 
Diet.  
 
Article 61.  The second paragraph of the preceding article applies also to the Diet 
approval required for the conclusion of treaties.  
 
Article 62. Each House may conduct investigations in relation to government, and may 
demand the presence and testimony of witnesses, and the production of records.  
 
Article 63. The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State may, at any time, appear in 
either House for the purpose of speaking on bills, regardless of whether they are members 
of the House or not. They must appear when their presence is required in order to give 
answers or explanations.  
 
Article 64. The Diet shall set up an impeachment court from among the members of both 
Houses for the purpose of trying those judges against whom removal proceedings have 
been instituted. 
Matters relating to impeachment shall be provided by law.  
 
CHAPTER V 
THE CABINET 
 
Article 65. Executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.  
 
Article 66. The Cabinet shall consist of the Prime Minister, who shall be its head, and 
other Ministers of State, as provided for by law. 
The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians. 
The Cabinet, in the exercise of executive power, shall be collectively responsible to the 
Diet.  
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Article 67. The Prime Minister shall be designated from among the members of the Diet 
by a resolution of the Diet. This designation shall precede all other business. 
If the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors disagree and if no 
agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for 
by law, or the House of Councillors fails to make designation within ten (10) days, 
exclusive of the period of recess, after the House of Representatives has made 
designation, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the 
Diet.  
 
Article 68. The Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers of State. However, a majority 
of their number must be chosen from among the members of the Diet. 
The Prime Minister may remove the Ministers of State as he chooses.  
 
Article 69. If the House of Representatives passes a non–confidence resolution, or rejects 
a confidence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign en masse, unless the House of 
Representatives is dissolved within ten (10) days.  
 
Article 70. When there is a vacancy in the post of Prime Minister, or upon the first 
convocation of the Diet after a general election of members of the House of 
Representatives, the Cabinet shall resign en masse.  
 
Article 71. In the cases mentioned in the two preceding articles, the Cabinet shall 
continue its functions until the time when a new Prime Minister is appointed.  
 
Article 72. The Prime Minister, representing the Cabinet, submits bills, reports on general 
national affairs and foreign relations to the Diet and exercises control and supervision 
over various administrative branches.  
 
Article 73. The Cabinet, in addition to other general administrative functions, shall 
perform the following functions: 
Administer the law faithfully; conduct affairs of state. 
Manage foreign affairs. 
Conclude treaties. However, it shall obtain prior or, depending on circumstances, 
subsequent approval of the Diet. 
Administer the civil service, in accordance with standards established by law. 
Prepare the budget, and present it to the Diet. 
Enact cabinet orders in order to execute the provisions of this Constitution and of the law. 
However, it cannot include penal provisions in such cabinet orders unless authorized by 
such law. 
Decide on general amnesty, special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and 
restoration of rights.  
 
Article 74. All laws and cabinet orders shall be signed by the competent Minister of State 
and countersigned by the Prime Minister.  
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Article 75. The Ministers of State, during their tenure of office, shall not be subject to 
legal action without the consent of the Prime Minister. However, the right to take that 
action is not impaired hereby.  
 
CHAPTER VI 
JUDICIARY 
 
Article 76. The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior 
courts as are established by law. 
No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor shall any organ or agency of the 
Executive be given final judicial power. 
All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound 
only by this Constitution and the laws.  
 
Article 77. The Supreme Court is vested with the rule–making power under which it 
determines the rules of procedure and of practice, and of matters relating to attorneys, the 
internal discipline of the courts and the administration of judicial affairs. 
Public procurators shall be subject to the rule–making power of the Supreme Court.  
The Supreme Court may delegate the power to make rules for inferior courts to such 
courts.  
 
Article 78. Judges shall not be removed except by public impeachment unless judicially 
declared mentally or physically incompetent to perform official duties. No disciplinary 
action against judges shall be administered by any executive organ or agency.  
 
Article 79. The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and such number of judges 
as may be determined by law; all such judges excepting the Chief Judge shall be 
appointed by the Cabinet. 
The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be reviewed by the people at 
the first general election of members of the House of Representatives following their 
appointment, and shall be reviewed again at the first general election of members of the 
House of Representatives after a lapse of ten (10) years, and in the same manner 
thereafter. 
In cases mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, when the majority of the voters favors the 
dismissal of a judge, he shall be dismissed. 
Matters pertaining to review shall be prescribed by law. 
The judges of the Supreme Court shall be retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed 
by law. 
All such judges shall receive, at regular stated intervals, adequate compensation which 
shall not be decreased during their terms of office.  
 
Article 80. The judges of the inferior courts shall be appointed by the Cabinet from a list 
of persons nominated by the Supreme Court. All such judges shall hold office for a term 
of ten (10) years with privilege of reappointment, provided that they shall be retired upon 
the attainment of the age as fixed by law. 
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The judges of the inferior courts shall receive, at regular stated intervals, adequate 
compensation which shall not be decreased during their terms of office.  
 
Article 81. The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the 
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.  
 
Article 82. Trials shall be conducted and judgment declared publicly. 
Where a court unanimously determines publicity to be dangerous to public order or 
morals, a trial may be conducted privately, but trials of political offenses, offenses 
involving the press or cases wherein the rights of people as guaranteed in Chapter III of 
this Constitution are in question shall always be conducted publicly.  
 
CHAPTER VII 
FINANCE 
 
Article 83. The power to administer national finances shall be exercised as the Diet shall 
determine.  
 
Article 84. No new taxes shall be imposed or existing ones modified except by law or 
under such conditions as law may prescribe.  
 
Article 85. No money shall be expended, nor shall the State obligate itself, except as 
authorized by the Diet.  
 
Article 86. The Cabinet shall prepare and submit to the Diet for its consideration and 
decision a budget for each fiscal year.  
 
Article 87.  In order to provide for unforeseen deficiencies in the budget, a reserve fund 
may be authorized by the Diet to be expended upon the responsibility of the Cabinet. 
The Cabinet must get subsequent approval of the Diet for all payments from the reserve 
fund.  
 
Article 88. All property of the Imperial Household shall belong to the State. All expenses 
of the Imperial Household shall be appropriated by the Diet in the budget.  
 
Article 89. No public money or other property shall be expended or appropriated for the 
use, benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or association, or for any 
charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not under the control of public authority.  
 
Article 90. Final accounts of the expenditures and revenues of the State shall be audited 
annually by a Board of Audit and submitted by the Cabinet to the Diet, together with the 
statement of audit, during the fiscal year immediately following the period covered. 
The organization and competency of the Board of Audit shall be determined by law.  
 
Article 91. At regular intervals and at least annually the Cabinet shall report to the Diet 
and the people on the state of national finances.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
LOCAL SELF–GOVERNMENT 
 
Article 92. Regulations concerning organization and operations of local public entities 
shall be fixed by law in accordance with the principle of local autonomy.  
 
Article 93. The local public entities shall establish assemblies as their deliberative organs, 
in accordance with law. 
The chief executive officers of all local public entities, the members of their assemblies, 
and such other local officials as may be determined by law shall be elected by direct 
popular vote within their several communities.  
 
Article 94. Local public entities shall have the right to manage their property, affairs and 
administration and to enact their own regulations within law.  
 
Article 95. A special law, applicable only to one local public entity, cannot be enacted by 
the Diet without the consent of the majority of the voters of the local public entity 
concerned, obtained in accordance with law.  
 
CHAPTER IX 
AMENDMENTS 
 
Article 96.  Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a 
concurring vote of two–thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall 
thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative 
vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as 
the Diet shall specify. 
Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the 
name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution.  
 
CHAPTER X 
SUPREME LAW 
 
Article 97.  The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people 
of Japan are fruits of the age–old struggle of man to be free; they have survived the many 
exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to 
be held for all time inviolate.  
 
Article 98.  This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, 
ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the 
provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity. 
The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully 
observed. 
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Article 99.  The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the 
Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this 
Constitution.  
 
CHAPTER XI 
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS 
 
Article 100.  This Constitution shall be enforced as from the day when the period of six 
months will have elapsed counting from the day of its promulgation. 
The enactment of laws necessary for the enforcement of this Constitution, the election of 
members of the House of Councillors and the procedure for the convocation of the Diet 
and other preparatory procedures necessary for the enforcement of this Constitution may 
be executed before the day prescribed in the preceding paragraph.  
 
Article 101.  If the House of Councillors is not constituted before the effective date of 
this Constitution, the House of Representatives shall function as the Diet until such time 
as the House of Councillors shall be constituted.  
 
Article 102.  The term of office for half the members of the House of Councillors serving 
in the first term under this Constitution shall be three years. Members falling under this 
category shall be determined in accordance with law.  
 
Article 103.  The Ministers of State, members of the House of Representatives and judges 
in office on the effective date of this Constitution, and all other public officials who 
occupy positions corresponding to such positions as are recognized by this Constitution 
shall not forfeit their positions automatically on account of the enforcement of this 
Constitution unless otherwise specified by law. When, however, successors are elected or 
appointed under the provisions of this Constitution, they shall forfeit their positions as a 
matter of course. 
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Appendix B.  Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United 
States of America
256
 
 
 
TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN JAPAN AND 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Signed January 19, 1960) 
 
Japan and the United States of America, 
 
Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between 
them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, 
desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote 
conditions of economic stability and well–being in their countries, reaffirming their faith 
in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to 
live in peace with all peoples and all governments, recognizing that they have the 
inherent right of individual or collective self–defense as affirmed in the Charter of the 
United Nations, considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of 
international peace and security in the Far East, having resolved to conclude a treaty of 
mutual cooperation and security, 
 
Therefore agree as follows: 
 
ARTICLE I 
 
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any 
international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner 
that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes 
of the United Nations. The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace–loving 
countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international 
peace and security may be discharged more effectively.  
 
ARTICLE II 
 
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly 
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better 
understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by 
promoting conditions of stability and well–being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in 
their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between 
them.  
 
 
                                                 
256
 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America. Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America. (Washington, DC, 
1960), accessed September 17, 2015. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html. 
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ARTICLE III 
The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and 
effective self–help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their 
constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.  
 
ARTICLE IV 
 
The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this 
Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international 
peace and security in the Far East is threatened.  
 
ARTICLE V 
 
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the 
administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that 
it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions 
and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the 
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international 
peace and security.  
 
ARTICLE VI 
 
For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of 
international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted 
the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these 
facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be 
governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article 
III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at 
Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be 
agreed upon.  
 
ARTICLE VII 
 
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights 
and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the 
responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.  
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ARTICLE VIII 
 
This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America in accordance 
with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on 
which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.  
 
ARTICLE IX 
 
The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at the city of 
San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this 
Treaty.  
 
ARTICLE X 
 
This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the 
United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations 
arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and 
security in the Japan area. However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, 
either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in 
which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.  
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.  
DONE in duplicate at Washington in the Japanese and English languages, both equally 
authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.  
 
FOR JAPAN:  
Nobusuke Kishi  
Aiichiro Fujiyama  
Mitsujiro Ishii  
Tadashi Adachi  
Koichiro Asakai  
 
FOR THE United States OF AMERICA:  
Christian A. Herter  
Douglas MacArthur 2nd  
J. Graham Parsons 
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Appendix C.  The Budapest Memorandum 
 
 
UNITED NATIONS
257
 
 
General Assembly Security Council 
 
Distr. GENERAL 
 
 
A/49/765*  
S/1994/1399* 
19 December 1994  
ORIGINAL:  ENGLISH 
  
 
 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY                                                         SECURITY COUNCIL 
Forty–ninth session                                                                   Forty–ninth year 
Agenda items 62 and 70 
 
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT MAINTENANCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
 
 
Letter dated 7 December 1994 from the Permanent Representatives of the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary–General 
 
 
Upon instructions from our Governments, we have the honour to transmit herewith the 
text of the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s 
Accession to the Treaty on the Non–Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed on 5 
December 1994 by the Presidents of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the United 
States of America, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland (annex I), and the text of the Joint Declaration issued on 5 December 
1994 by the leaders of our States (annex II). 
 
We should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annexes 
circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 62 and 70, and of 
the Security Council. 
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(Signed)  Anatoli M. ZLENKO                    (Signed)  Sergey V. LAVROV 
Permanent Representative                            Permanent Representative 
of Ukraine to the United Nations                 of the Russian Federation to the  
                                                                      United Nations 
 
 
(Signed)  David HANNAY 
Permanent Representative of the              (Signed)  Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and                  Permanent Representative Northern Ireland to 
the United Nations                                    of the United States of  America to the  
                                                                  United Nations 
 
*   Reissued for technical reasons. 
 
94–50764 (E)   191294                                                       /... 
 
 
A/49/765  
S/1994/1399 
English Page 2 
 
ANNEX I 
 
                                                                                       [Original:  English and Russian] 
 
Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the 
Treaty on the Non–Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons 
 
Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the United States of America, 
 
Welcoming the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non–Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons as a non–nuclear–weapon State, 
 
Taking into account the commitment of Ukraine to eliminate all nuclear weapons from its 
territory within a specified period of time, 
 
Noting the changes in the world–wide security situation, including the end of the cold 
war, which have brought about conditions for deep reductions in nuclear forces, 
 
Confirm the following: 
 
1.The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with 
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the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine; 
 
2.The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the United States of America reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none 
of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self–defence or otherwise in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; 
 
3.The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with 
the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the 
exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages 
of any kind; 
 
4.The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate United 
Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non–nuclear–
weapon State party to the Treaty on the 
Non–Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of 
aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used; 
 
/... 
 
A/49/765  
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English Page 3 
 
5.The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the United States of America reaffirm, in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to 
use nuclear weapons against any non–nuclear– weapon State party to the Treaty on the 
Non–Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on themselves, 
their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a State 
in association or alliance with a nuclear–weapon State; 
 
6.Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the United States of America will consult in the event a situation arises that 
raises a question concerning these commitments. 
 
This Memorandum will become applicable upon signature. 
 
Signed in four copies having equal validity in the Ukrainian, English and Russian 
languages. 
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For Ukraine: 
(Signed)  Leonid D. KUCHMA 
 
For the Russian Federation: (Signed)  Boris N. YELTSIN 
 
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: (Signed)  John MAJOR 
 
For the United States of America: (Signed)  William J. CLINTON 
 
/... 
 
A/49/765 
S/1994/1399 
English Page 4 
 
ANNEX II 
 
                                                                                          [Original:  English and Russian] 
 
Joint Declaration issued on 5 December 1994 at Budapest by the leaders of the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
United States of America 
 
The leaders of the United States of America, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland met during the summit meeting of 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 
 
The leaders discussed the evolution of European security architecture. 
 
They underscored their determination to support the increasingly strong tendencies 
towards the formation of security based on political partnership, and to cooperate in the 
further development of a security system that embraces all the CSCE States.  This will 
involve the evolution – given the new realities – of transatlantic and regional mechanisms 
of security in a manner that enhances the security and stability of all CSCE States. 
 
They are committed to continuing the process of building political, military and 
economic security in an undivided Europe, in which integration opened for participation 
and transparency are characteristic. 
 
The leaders confirmed that CSCE commitments in the area of human rights, economics 
and security represent the cornerstone of the common European security space, and that 
they help ensure that countries and peoples in this space are not subjected further to the 
threat of military force or other undesirable consequences of aggressive nationalism and 
chauvinism. 
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They noted that the historical chances in the world, including the end of the confrontation 
between blocs of the cold war, create favourable conditions for the further strengthening 
of security and stability on the European continent and for deep reductions in nuclear 
forces. 
 
In this regard, the leaders discussed the implementation of the trilateral statement of 14 
January 1994.  They noted progress in the implementation of this statement. 
 
The leaders also confirmed that an important contribution to the broader process of 
strengthening security and stability is also made by such agreements as the Treaty on 
Conventional Forces in Europe, the open skies treaty, and confidence– and security–
building measures. 
----- 
 
